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Abstract
In the ability model of emotional intelligence by Mayer and Salovey (1997),
emotional understanding is a prerequisite for emotion regulation. Knowing
which emotions occur in which situations should be beneficial and adaptive.
One of the subtests for emotional understanding asks for likely emotional
reactions in hypothetical situations. In contrast, Gilbert and Wilson (2003)
argue that characteristic biases in affective forecasting are adaptive. The
current thesis aims to measure accuracy of emotional predictions in a na-
tural setting and examines its adaptive value. In the anxiety study, public
officials were asked to predict future emotions in an important test (N=143).
The second study focused on freshman student work-groups (N=180 in 43
groups). Group members predicted interpersonal feelings for each other (af-
fection, satisfaction with the collaboration, fun, and anger). In both studies,
accuracy of emotional predictions is defined as low bias (i.e. Euclidean di-
stance) and high correspondence (i.e. profile correlation). The round robin
design in the work-group study also allows to decompose accuracy following
Cronbach (1955). In both studies, a low bias was adaptive in terms of strong
criteria, also incrementally over and above intelligence and personality alo-
ne. Accuracy was partly related to general knowledge but not to intelligence.
Associations to emotional intelligence were inconsistent. Accuracy as corre-
spondence is theoretically interesting but much less reliable. There is some
evidence for its adaptive value on a group level but no indication of in-
cremental validity. Future research should focus on specific situations and
specific emotions. Also, processes underlying affective forecasts should be
evaluated in detail.
i
Zusammenfassung
Im Rahmen des Leistungsansatzes von emotionaler Intelligenz sehen Mayer
und Salovey (1997) Emotionsverstaendnis als Voraussetzung für Emotions-
regulation. Es sollte nützlich sein zu wissen, wie man sich in bestimmten
Situationen fühlen wird. Zur Messung werden unter anderem Vignetten
eingesetzt, in denen Emotionen für hypothetische Situationen vorhergesagt
werden. Im Gegensatz dazu postulieren Gilbert und Wilson (2003) charak-
teristische Fehler bei affektiven Vorhersagen, die motivational günstig sind.
In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird die Akkuratheit emotionaler Vorhersagen
im natürlichen Umfeld untersucht, um dessen adaptiven Wert zu beurtei-
len. Zunächst sollten Beamtenanwärter ihre Emotionen in einer bedeuten-
den Testsituation vorhersagen (N=143). Dann wurden studentische Arbeits-
gruppen (180 Mitglieder in 43 Gruppen) gebeten, Gefühle zwischen den Mit-
gliedern zu prognostizieren (Zuneigung, Zufriedenheit mit der Zusammen-
arbeit, Freude und Ärger). Akkuratheit wurde als geringer Bias (euklidische
Distanz) und hohe Korrespondenz (Profilkorrelation) definiert. Das Round
Robin Design der zweiten Studie ermöglichte die Varianzzerlegung der Ak-
kuratheit nach Cronbach (1955). In beiden Studien ist ein niedriger Bias ad-
aptiv in Hinblick auf harte Kriterien, auch inkrementell über Intelligenz und
Persönlichkeit hinaus. Bias hing teilweise mit Allgemeinwissen zusammen,
aber nicht mit Intelligenz. Zusammenhänge zu emotionaler Intelligenz waren
inkonsistent. Die Akkuratheit als Korrespondenz ist theoretisch interessant
aber deutlich weniger reliabel. Auf Gruppenebene konnte die Korrespondenz
Kriterien vorhersagen, aber es zeigte sich keine inkrementelle Validität. Zu-
künftige Forschung sollte sich auf spezifische Situationen und spezifische
Emotionen konzentrieren sowie die Prozesse untersuchen, die emotionalen
Vorhersagen zugrunde liegen.
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Chapter 1
General Introduction
In recent years, the concept of emotional intelligence (EI) has been recei-
ving increasing attention. Publications on EI have grown exponentially over
at least two decades, and economic interest creates considerable market
demands regarding measurement and training. Whereas the concept is em-
braced in public, it is controversially debated, if not severely criticized in
academia. It is generally plausible that people differ in their ability regarding
emotions, i.e. that some are more likely to succeed in emotionally challeng-
ing situations. Also, it is easy to appreciate the fact that emotion-related
skills and characteristics, like dealing with stress, managing conflict or stay-
ing optimistic, are valuable in life and many people may perceive someone
to be emotionally gifted. EI proves useful to talk about success in everyday
life, especially in social life. Nearly every useful addition to general intelli-
gence can be projected into this concept. Also, it emphasizes strengths that
go beyond scholastic achievement. When it comes to the theoretical basis,
though, and to generally accepted definitions and measurement procedures,
academic intelligence outclasses EI by far.
The current thesis aims to add to the comprehension of emotional un-
derstanding, one subbranch of the ability model of emotional intelligence
(Mayer & Salovey, 1997). Currently, vignette items of hypothetical situ-
1
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ations are used for its measurement. In the conducted studies, emotional
understanding was assessed in a natural setting and hypothetical situations
were replaced with real ones. Participants were asked to predict their emo-
tions and, later on, the same participants reported on their actual experi-
ences. Predictions and experiences are now combined to calculate accuracy
scores in terms of a low bias (i.e. Euclidean Distance) and high correspon-
dence (i.e. profile correlation). This accuracy is related to abilities, traits,
emotionally relevant criteria.
The ability model aims to define emotional intelligence as intelligence in
the content domain of emotions. To do so, performance should be evaluated
as right or wrong, with right answers to be generally preferable. Since emo-
tional understanding is defined as emotional knowledge, it is obvious that
accurate knowledge should be worth thriving for. In this sense, Mayer and
Salovey (1997) see emotional understanding as a prerequisite of emotional
management, so that accurate knowledge can be used to effectively influ-
ence emotions in ourselves and others. In other words, accuracy should be
adaptive.
Other lines of research have taken different approaches. The notion of
depressive realism suggests that depression is associated with accurate ex-
pectations which consolidate the disease (Alloy & Abramson, 1979). Others
emphasized that a ’rosy view’ is preferable (Mitchell, Thompson, Peterson,
& Cronk, 1997), and that there are certain biases in affective forecasting
that can serve a purpose (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). One of these biases
is immune neglect, i.e. the lack of insight into mood repair processes and,
therefore, the overestimation of the duration of emotions. This is supposed
to be functional because it enforces to seek positive events and to avoid
negative ones (Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998).
Generally, for the predictions of one’s own emotions, the adaptability
of accuracy can be called into question. The current thesis explores this
Chapter 1. General Introduction 3
domain with a special focus on predictions for different targets. Two studies
were conducted. In the anxiety study, public officials predicted emotions in
an important exam situation. The design is comparable to typical affective
forecasting studies, and it focuses on a negative emotion toward a specific
event. Results can be interpreted in context of affective forecasting studies,
and it can be explored how interindividual differences in bias relate to cri-
teria. Even if a general bias is functional, it probably should not be as high
as possible. Also, an accurate view can be compared to a rosy one.
In contrast, the work-group study focuses on the prediction of inter-
personal feelings and relationship development. Following the EI rationale,
emotional knowledge can be used to establish positive and effective relation-
ships. This adds a social perspective to emotional predictions and allows to
examine emotional understanding as to the self and others. This is especially
important since the original conceptualization of ability EI emphasized this
distinction.
In both studies, accuracy of emotional predictions will be related to
abilities, traits, and criteria. Construct validity and incremental value will be
reported. Then, strengths and limitations will be discussed and possibilities
for future research will be explored.
Chapter 2
Theoretical Background
The aim of this thesis is to explore the accuracy of emotional predictions
and its relation to other abilities, traits, and criteria. First, research on
emotional intelligence (EI) is introduced (2.1) and problems regarding its
conceptualization and measurement are discussed. Secondly, research on
emotional predictions is presented (2.2). Then, the calculation of accuracy
is addressed (2.3). In a last step, these theoretical frameworks are combined
and it is argued that emotional understanding, as one branch of ability EI,
can be conceptualized as accuracy of emotional predictions (2.4).
2.1 Emotional Intelligence
Contrary to popular beliefs, the concept of emotional intelligence was not
introduced by Goleman (1995) but by Salovey and Mayer (1990). The
original idea was to broaden traditional views of intelligence and to fur-
ther explore the content domain of emotions. It was Goleman’s publication,
however, that triggered an overwhelming public interest for the concept,
led to broad media coverage, and established its role in the business world
(e.g. Matthews, Zeidner, & Roberts, 2003). Academically the concept has
been less enthusiastically perceived. EI is called obscure and unnecessary,
4
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as well as mainly a label to make money (e.g. Brody, 2004; Asendorpf,
2002). Before the criticism is addressed, two opposing frameworks will be
distinguished because they are associated with different problems.
Whereas the ability model aims to assess maximal performance regard-
ing emotions (cf. Ackerman, 1994; Cronbach, 1984), mixed models rely on
self report to capture typical performance as to different emotion-related
traits and skills. Empirically, the ability model of EI and different kinds
of mixed models are only weakly related, if at all. A meta-analysis of Van
Rooy and Viswesvaran (2004) reports an association of .13 which does not
support the assumption of a coherent construct. In a more recent meta-
analysis, self-report and ability measures of EI only correlate with .12, even
if they are both meant to capture the ability model. Zeidner, Shani-Zivotich,
Matthews, and Roberts (2005) compared ability and mixed model EI in
gifted and non-gifted high school students. Gifted students scored high on
the MSCEIT but low on self-reports EI and non-gifted students low on the
MSCEIT and high on the self-reports.
The mixed models capture different desirable and more or less emotion-
related traits and competencies. Bar-On (1997), for example, defined EI
as ’an array of non-cognitive capabilities, competencies, and skills that in-
fluence one’s ability to succeed in coping with environmental demands and
pressures’ (p. 6). The main problem with these models is a lack of dis-
criminant validity regarding standard personality measures (Van Rooy &
Viswesvaran, 2004; Van Rooy, Viswesvaran, & Pluta, 2005; Joseph & New-
man, 2010) and a high number of subscales with substantial conceptional
overlap. Also, the validity of self reports of competencies must be ques-
tioned (e.g Kruger & Dunning, 1999). The Emotional Quotient inventory
(EQ-i, Bar-On, 1997), for example, distinguishes 5 scales and 15 subscales.
Problem solving is measured with items like My approach in overcoming dif-
ficulties is to move step by step. and social responsibility contains items like
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I like helping people. According to a reanalysis of Matthews et al. (2003, p.
209f), ’80- 90 % of the reliable variance in the scales can be explained by
just three factors, [...] self-esteem, empathy, and impulse control.’ There-
fore, EI as measured with the mixed model approach does not warrant a
new construct called emotional intelligence.
The ability model shows slightly more promising results to support a
new construct of EI. In their early definition, Salovey and Mayer (1990)
state that EI ’involves the ability to monitor one’s own and others’ feelings
and emotions, to discriminate among them, and to use this information to
guide one’s thinking and action’ (p. 189). Thus, intelligence is applied to
emotions. Rather than self-reported typical performance, maximal perfor-
mance (cf. Ackerman, 1994; Cronbach, 1984) is assessed in terms of right
and wrong. Accordingly, the MSCEIT, as the prominent diagnostic tool
of ability EI (Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2001), is less susceptible to fak-
ing than self report measures (Day & Carroll, 2008). The relationship of
ability EI to general intelligence is moderate and within expectations (.32
and .22, Van Rooy & Viswesvaran, 2004; Joseph & Newman, 2010), with
a strong relationship to emotional understanding (.39, Joseph & Newman,
2010). Also, there was evidence for discriminant validity regarding person-
ality measures (Van Rooy & Viswesvaran, 2004), which has been called into
question since (Fiori & Antonakis, 2011). The test is severely criticized for
its psychometric properties, lack of incremental predictive validity, and its
scoring procedure (e.g. Matthews et al., 2003). Mayer, Salovey, Caruso,
and Cherkasskiy (2011) argue that the MSCEIT represents an integrative
ability model of EI as opposed to specific-ability models that ’examine a
particular realm of emotional intelligence in depth – for example, perceiving
emotion in faces’ (p. 531). However, the current trend is to focus on specific
abilities and to add theoretical depth (e.g. Matthews, Zeidner, & Roberts,
2012; Mayer, Roberts, & Barsade, 2008).
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The MSCEIT measures four branches of ability EI: perceiving emo-
tions, facilitating thought, understanding emotions and managing emotions
(Mayer et al., 2001). Those branches reflect the definition of Mayer and
Salovey (1997): EI is ’ ...the ability to perceive emotions, to access and
generate emotions so as to assist thought, to understand emotions and emo-
tional knowledge, and to reflectively regulate emotions so as to promote
emotional and intellectual growth’ (p. 5).
Right and wrong answers in the MSCEIT are not as easily determined
as in standard intelligence tests. There are three different scoring proce-
dures: consensus scoring, expert scoring, and target scoring (Mayer, Salovey,
Caruso, & Sitarenios, 2003). Consensus scoring is most common and applied
in the current study. For each question, there is a frequency distribution in
the norm sample that is used to score the answers. Participants who agree
with the majority of the norm sample receive higher scores. With consensus
scoring, it is logically impossible to diagnose emotional genius because the
best answers are those of many. Roberts, Zeidner, and Matthews (2001)
hypothesize that consensus scoring causes the MSCEIT to measure social
conformity.
Expert soring means that right and wrong answers are calculated based
on the agreement with the experts’ opinion, and target scoring defines a
right answer as that of the target. In the MSCEIT, target scoring can only
be applied to one subtest of the branch perceiving emotions. An emotion
attributed to a facial expression will be considered right, if the actual person
that is depicted wants to convey that emotion. For all other items in the
MSCEIT, targets are hypothetical and non-existent. The paradigm of this
thesis can be conceptualized as target scoring of emotional understanding
because the actual experiences of certain targets serve as a scoring criterion
for accurate predictions.
According to Mayer and Salovey (1997), EI is generally adaptive because
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it guides thought and action. They state that people with high emotional
ability should have good mental health. Their well-being is promoted by
effective emotion regulation in self and others, so that ’the emotionally in-
telligent person is often a pleasure to be around and leaves others feeling
better’ (Salovey & Mayer, 1990, p. 201). This statement can be called into
question. High cognitive ability as to emotions could be used to manipulate
others (Matthews et al., 2003) or to end undesirable relationships. In some
cases, there needs to be a trade-off between one’s own and others’ goals
and between short- and long-term consequences. Not all criteria can be met
in every situation. Someone might achieve their social goals, without, for
example, being generally well-perceived. Thus, the relationship to different
criteria is not easily predicted and highly context-specific (cf. Matthews et
al., 2012).
The focus of the current thesis is on emotional understanding as a sub-
branch of EI. It is defined as the ability ’... to understand emotions and to
utilize emotional knowledge’ (Mayer & Salovey, 1997, p. 12). More precisely,
according to Mayer et al. (2001) it includes understanding the relationships
among emotions, knowing causes and consequences, understanding complex
emotions and blends, and being aware of potential transitions among emo-
tions. Emotional understanding should be based on emotional perception
and facilitation, and it should enable emotional management. Joseph and
Newman (2010) propose a cascading model of EI that drops emotional facil-
itation and states that perception influences understanding which influences
regulation.
One subtest of emotional understanding presents hypothetical situa-
tional vignettes. Participants are asked which emotions will likely arise in
these situations, and how these emotions are going to develop. Since emo-
tional understanding promotes emotional regulation, this knowledge, i.e.
knowing which emotions are elicited in certain situations, should facilitate
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success for the self and for others. There is evidence for the adaptive value
of emotional knowledge in children (e.g. Denham & Kochanoff, 2002). It
is important to note, though, that emotional knowledge in this context is
measured with items similar to the MSCEIT subbranch emotional percep-
tion. For example, Izard et al. (2001) showed photographs of emotional
expressions. Then, children were asked to freely label these emotions and
to recognize emotional labels in a multiple-choice-task.
In sum, Mayer and Salovey (1997) believe that accurate knowledge about
emotions is generally desirable because it helps to understand causes and
consequences and because it can guide behavior. In contrast, (e.g. Wilson &
Gilbert, 2003) assume that biases in emotional predictions can be beneficial.
Without a general focus on individual differences, numerous studies found
evidence for such biases.
2.2 Research on Emotional Predictions
When emotional predictions are examined on a group level, there is evidence
for many inaccuracies. Mountain climbers, for example, underestimate the
torment involved in their endeavors (Mitchell et al., 1997). Which is not only
assumed to be without negative consequences but to be functional. People
are more likely to approach certain situations again, when they overlook
negative side effects. This promotes positive experiences.
A lack of useful biases has been called depressive realism (Alloy &
Abramson, 1979). It indicates that part of affective disorders is the ac-
curate perception of negative aspects. This leads to avoidance of activity
and enhances the symptoms of depression since positive experiences become
less likely. Similarly, Gilbert (2006) claims that it might be accurate to pick
up on social rejection and it might be true that most leisure activities have
burdening aspects, but seeing this does not make us happy. Empirical ev-
idence on depressive realism is mixed. Dunning and Story (1991) suggest
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that it is not a universal phenomenon but can become relevant under certain
conditions.
Besides the underestimation of negative affect in positive situations, as
mentioned above, Gilbert et al. (1998) focus on the overestimation of pain
and its duration in negative situations. They argue that people generally
assume to be immensely and long-lastingly affected by traumatic life ex-
periences, for example the death of a child, paralysis, job-loss, or severe
illness. In contrast, the actual negative impact of such events on emotional
well-being is more short-lived. After a negative event, many people associate
something valuable with it, for example an opportunity for personal growth.
People might appreciate life to a higher extent, value the social support that
they received, or focus on positive aspects of an occupational change. All
these considerations are examples of mood repair processes that come into
play after the fact. Gilbert et al. (1998) assume that there is a psychological
immune system that, similarly to the actual immune system, operates be-
yond awareness. This unawareness of mood repair is called immune neglect,
and it explains why accomplishments of the psychological immune system
are generally not foreseen. This bias is adaptive because people will work
harder to prevent negative events if they overestimate the negative impact.
This conceptualization of mood repair as mainly automatic and preferably
beyond awareness contradicts the idea of emotional knowledge that is ac-
tively used to manage emotions.
Immune neglect is one topic examined in affective forecasting research
(Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). In this paradigm, participants predict the valence
of emotional reactions in certain situations. In most cases, another sample of
participants report on their actual emotional experiences. Then, predictions
and experiences are compared on a group level. Individual differences are
seldom addressed but Hoerger (2012) found that interindividual differences
in coping styles are indeed not taken into account when predicting emotions
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for Valentine’s Day with or without a date.
Originally, individual differences were overlooked in affective forecasting
research, even if early studies already provided evidence for such differences.
A study by Gilbert and Ebert (2002) showed that 66.3 % of the participants
made emotionally biased decisions in a dichotomous task which implies that
33.7 % of the subjects, a rather large group, did not. Those studies that
focus on interindividual differences rely on prediction error scores, i.e. the
simple difference scores between predictions and criteria (Dunn, Brackett,
Ashton-James, Schneiderman, & Salovey, 2007; Hoerger, Chapman, Epstein,
& Duberstein, 2012; Hoerger, 2012). Also, Dunn et al. (2007) uses a one-
item measure of affect, specifically valence on a 9-point scale.
Wilson and Gilbert (2003, p.354) argue that affective forecasting involves
a series of steps. First, we mentally simulate the situation for which the fore-
cast is made. Construal is the process that builds a mental representation
of the event. Then, we recall affective theories to infer an assessed affective
reaction, and we correct for unique influences. All these factors lead to the
affective forecast.
Arguably the biggest source of unsystematic error is misconstrual of the
event. Error due to the recall of affective theories, on the other hand, is
valid since it reflects inadequate knowledge. In a similar way, the capability
to correct for unique influences (f.e. one’s own mood or person-specific
characteristics) can vary and represents emotional knowledge. Apart from
misconstrual and inaccurate theories, error in emotional predictions can be
caused by motivated distortions (f.e. exaggerations of negative emotions for
unwanted events), undercorrection (f.e. neglecting one’s own mood), and
focalism (to neglect other events and aspects that also influence our mood
(Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, & Wheatley, 2002). With regard to
the experience, Wilson and Gilbert (2003) distinguish the initial affective
experience and the affective experience over time. Sense making processes
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(like f.e. coping mechanisms) influence the transition from initial to later
emotional response.
Another framework that deals with the prediction of emotional reactions
(as prospective self-report) is the emotional self report model by Robinson
and Clore (2002a). Accordingly, when asked about future or hypothetical
emotional reactions, people can rely on four sources of information: the
episodic experience itself, episodic memory, situation specific beliefs, and
identity related beliefs. The first two are episodic in nature, experiential,
and contextualized. In contrast, the latter two are semantic and taken out
of context. An important assumption is that the emotion itself can never
be stored in memory, nor be retrieved from it. The episodic experience is
only available in online self-reports and thinking about emotions is always
qualitatively different from experiencing them (Robinson & Clore, 2002b).
When remembering an emotion, details of the situation are retrieved and
the according emotion is inferred. Real emotions can be elicited during the
retrieval process but these emotions are considered new emotions that are
never identical to the original ones.
Within the model of Robinson and Clore (2002a) three principles ap-
ply, namely accessibility, dominance, and evanescence. Accessibility means
that emotion reports are based on the most accessible knowledge. Domi-
nance means that the sources of information are hierarchically ordered and
early stages are more dominant than later ones. Shortly after an event, the
episodic memory can be accessed and this information will be used over
other sources. If situation specific information is available, it will be used
over the person specific one, and if episodic information is available, it will
be used over the situation specific one. The last principle, evanescence,
means that episodic aspects fade rapidly, in general. When this model is
applied, emotional understanding, as measured in the MSCEIT, primarily
focuses on situation specific beliefs. There is no actual experience involved,
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and the targets of predictions are non-existent.
When prospective and retrospective emotional self-reports are examined,
temporal distance of the event is important (Liberman, Sagristano, & Trope,
2002). With a background of construal level theory, Liberman et al. (2002)
assume that temporal distance influences the level of abstractness that is
applied to the mental construal of the event. Participants imagined events
in the near vs. distant future, meaning in a couple of days vs. in a year.
Near events were represented in more detail whereas far events were more
abstractly construed. The focus on detail and ambiguous information is
therefore impaired for distant events. Judgments should be holistic and
schema driven. For example, good days seemed better and bad days seemed
worse when they were imagined a year from now vs. tomorrow. The authors
compared these findings to the focalism hypothesis of Wilson, Wheatley,
Meyers, Gilbert, and Axsom (2000), arguing that focalism, or a disregard of
detail should be more likely for distant events. This points to the context-
dependency of accuracy of emotional predictions.
2.3 Accuracy Research
The main distinction regarding accuracy must be made between accuracy
in terms of profile similarity and accuracy in terms of a lack of bias or error.
Murphy and Balzer (1989) compared different accuracy and error scores
and found no substantial correlations between different types of measures.
This emphasizes the necessity to take both, profile similarity (here called
correspondence) and bias, into account (Kenny & Acitelli, 2001).
Early accuracy research only operated with bias scores, or more specif-
ically simple difference scores between predictors and criteria. This is also
done in affective forecasting and when individual differences in affective
forecasting accuracy are addressed (e.g Gilbert & Ebert, 2002; Hoerger et
al., 2012). In an influential article, Cronbach (1955) severely criticized this
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widespread approach. Bernieri (2001) attributes the substantial shift in fo-
cus, away from accuracy research, to this article. Kenny and Albright (1987)
see it as a central reason for social psychology focusing on social cognition
instead of social relations (for a critique of this phenomenon cf. Scholl,
2007).
Cronbach argued that difference scores fail to answer the general ques-
tion of accuracy in interpersonal perception because these scores confound
four distinguishable variance components of accuracy and thereby distort
a clear interpretation. The first one is elevation, as the mean difference
between predictors and criteria. The second type of accuracy, differential
elevation accuracy, captures to what extent differences between the targets
are accurately perceived by the judges. Then, stereotype accuracy represents
the accuracy regarding different traits. The last component of accuracy is
differential accuracy or the extent to which judges accurately capture target
variation on certain traits, i.e. the uniqueness of a trait-target combina-
tion. According to Cronbach (1955), this final component represents the
social perception accuracy that researchers are typically interested in. Bor-
man (1977) not only agrees that differential accuracy is the most important
part but states that differential elevation and stereotype accuracy are not
interesting in general.
Sulsky and Balzer (1988) emphasize the parallel nature of Cronbach’s
approach to analysis of variance. They state that elevation is comparable
to the differential grand mean, or the general deviation of predictions and
criteria. Differential elevation accuracy equals a main effect of ratees or tar-
gets, i.e. the variance in the predictions that can be explained with target
differences. Stereotype accuracy is the differential main effect of rating di-
mensions or traits, i.e. the variance in the predictions that can be explained
with differences regarding the traits. Finally, differential accuracy refers to
the interaction of targets and traits, i.e. variance in the predictions that
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captures target differences on specific traits.
It is not always possible to calculate all the components of accuracy
mentioned by Cronbach (1955). In order to calculate differential elevation
accuracy, the research design needs to distinguish different targets for which
predictions are made. Stereotype accuracy can only be calculated when
different traits are distinguished for every target, and differential accuracy
can only be distinguished from the error term when differential elevation
accuracy and stereotype accuracy can both be calculated.
Social perception studies vary regarding their nomological or ideographic
nature. They either focus on accuracy generally present in one group of par-
ticipants, i.e. nomological accuracy, or on individual differences in accuracy,
i.e. ideographic accuracy. Kenny and Albright (1987) generally argue for
an examination of accuracy on a group level because of reliability deficits.
The focus should be on when and how people are accurate and not on who
is accurate. They say that the failure to replicate findings is due to in-
sufficient variance. This is an important distinction from Cronbach (1955)
whose original intention was to focus on interindividual differences in ac-
curacy in order to distinguish good judges of personality (e.g. Colvin &
Bundick, 2001; Christiansen, Wolcott-Burnam, Janovics, Burns, & Quirk,
2005). Later, Kenny and Winquist (2001) revised the initial statement to
only focus on a group level. They suggested to combine the nomological
and the ideographic approach. In one case, moderators of groups level ac-
curacy are in focus, in the other case, individual accuracy scores are related
to criteria.
Social relation analysis is a theoretical and methodological framework
that can be used for multiple questions in interpersonal perception (Kenny,
1994). Here, it is used to decompose accuracy variance into perceiver and
target effects, indicating variance due to the judges and variance due to the
targets. When searching for a skill of emotional understanding in terms
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of emotional prediction accuracy, there should be a considerable perceiver
effect, indicating that people vary in their accuracy of their emotional pre-
dictions.
2.4 Research Questions
Emotional understanding was examined in emotionally challenging situa-
tions. From an emotional intelligence perspective, accuracy can easily be
conceptualized as a corollary of emotional understanding, one branch of the
ability model of EI by Mayer and Salovey (1997). Instead of using hypo-
thetical situational vignettes (like in the MSCEIT), participants will predict
emotions for actual upcoming situations. Their experiences in these situa-
tions will then serve as a scoring criterion. Accuracy will be calculated as
bias, i.e. Euclidean distance, and correspondence, i.e. profile correlation.
Also, the accuracy components of Cronbach (1955) will be calculated when
possible.
The main assumption of this thesis is that accurate predictions should
be based on acquired emotional knowledge which enables effective emotional
management. It should, thereby, be adaptive in emotional encounters. Emo-
tional knowledge is examined as to the self and to others, a distinction orig-
inally made by Salovey and Mayer (1990) in their definition of EI.
Two studies were conducted. The anxiety study focused on a specific
emotion in a specific context. Public officials predicted their own emotions
regarding an important test. Accuracy is related to independently measured
distress, coping strategies, and satisfaction with the grade. This study is
similar to affective forecasting studies but emphasizes individual differences
and incremental validity.
The work-group study examined emotional understanding in a social
context, a perspective that is often neglected. Freshman students gave a
prognosis on the relationship-development in newly emerging groups, specif-
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ically how interpersonal feelings were going to develop. Each group member
predicted affection, satisfaction with the collaboration, fun, and anger that
everyone in the group was going to feel for everyone else at the end of the
semester. The end of the semester was a point of time when much work
had to be done, presentations were held and part of the performance was
graded. Emotional understanding should help to develop positive and suc-
cessful relationships. This is arguably crucial, especially for freshman who
should be interested in new relationships. The round robin design allows for
accuracy decomposition following Cronbach (1955) and enables the calcula-
tion of potent peer ratings that capture how every individual is perceived
by their fellow group members.
Accurate knowledge about interpersonal feelings (i.e. who likes whom, or
who will be angry with whom) should provide important information when it
comes to gaining affection or avoiding conflict. Term paper ratings, conflict
levels, mutually perceived friendship and competence serve as criteria of
successful goal attainment. Additionally, in the second study emotional
predictions were done twice, so that retest reliabilities could be calculated.
The following research questions are addressed:
Bias, Correspondence, and other Abilities and Traits
As a proxy measure of emotional understanding, accuracy should be corre-
lated to EI, especially to emotional understanding. As an ability, it should
be moderately related to intelligence and general knowledge. Regarding
personality, it should show discriminant validity, i.e. low associations.
The Adaptability of Bias and Correspondence
Accuracy should promote emotional management for the self and for others.
Therefore, it should be related to less distress, better coping strategies, and
positive relationship development. Satisfaction with the grade (in the anx-
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iety study) and the term paper rating (in the work-group study) represent
personal success that should be promoted by emotional knowledge, as well.
Connection to the Affective Forecasting Paradigm
This can only be tested in the anxiety study. On a group level, affective
forecasting results should be replicated, specifically the overestimation of
the duration of negative emotions. Regardless of a general bias, though,
accuracy should again be adaptive as to the criteria because it enables emo-
tional management.
Stability of Bias and Correspondence
This can only be tested in the work-group study. As a measure of individ-
ual differences, bias and correspondence should be stable in terms of retest
reliability. When social relation analysis is applied, accuracy should show a
substantial perceiver effect indicating that some people are generally better
in predicting future emotions than others.
Chapter 3
Study 1: Anxiety Study
3.1 Methods
3.1.1 Sample
The participants in this study were public officials attending a specialized
school for law, city administration, and social sciences. The educational
program lasted for 3 years and participants had attended for 1 month when
they entered the study. Tenured positions were only available for the top
20 % of the students, based on the grades in the final exams. The other
students had to seek employment elsewhere.
The student population consisted of 149 subjects in five different classes.
Participation was voluntary, anonymous, and rewarded with detailed written
feedback on the conducted tests. Data was collected in class, and missing
data occurred due to nonattendance in certain lessons. 143 students took
part and 112 students completed all measurements. The mean age was 24.27
years (range: 18 - 41, SD = 5.52) and 55.9 % were female.
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3.1.2 Procedure
The study took approximately six months from October 2005 to March
2006 and covered the first semester in school. Each of the five classes com-
pleted the questionnaires in the same week, either on Tuesday, Wednesday,
or Thursday. All the questionnaires were conducted in class with a teacher
accessible for questions. This teacher collected the data for a diploma thesis.
The course of the data collection is presented in Table 3.1. The emotion-
ally challenging event was a social science test in the 1st week of December,
which was the first in a series of critical examinations. One month prior
to this test, participants were asked to predict their own and the group’s
average emotional reaction immediately before, immediately after, and one
hour after the test. At the time of prediction, the students had completed
three weeks of the program and were familiar with the procedures and the
classmates. General mood was measured directly before the predictions
were made. Intelligence, personality, and trait anxiety were measured after-
wards. Emotional intelligence was measured later due to time constraints
in class. On the day of the test itself, students reported their emotional
experiences analogous to the predictions, i.e. immediately before, immedi-
ately after, and one hour after the test. To measure criteria of adaptability
or emotional management, participants completed a coping inventory and
reported their emotional distress one week prior to the main examinations.
For reasons of data protection, there was no data on actual grades available
but participants rated the satisfaction with their grade in the social science
test.
3.1.3 Material
Psychometric Tests. Intelligence was measured with the short version of the
Culture Fair Intelligence Test (CFT 3, German adaptation Cattell & Weiß,
1971) which focuses on general fluid intelligence. The item material consists
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Table 3.1: Anxiety Study: Course of the Data Collection
Date Landmarks and Tests Conducted
2nd Week in October Beginning of the School Program
1st Week in November Demographic Data
Mood
Emotional Predictions
Intelligence
Personality
Trait Anxiety
1st Week in December Social Science test
Emotional Experiences
(before, after, one hour later)
2nd Week in December Coping
3rd Week in December Distress
4th Week in December Examinations
1st Week in January Results of the Social-Science-Test
Satisfaction with the Grade
2nd Week in January Emotional Intelligence
of figural matrices and takes approximately 15 minutes. The test provides
two parallel forms. Here, the short version of test form A was administered.
Emotional intelligence was measured with the The Mayer-Salovey-Caruso
Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT) V 2.0 (Mayer et al., 2001), an instru-
ment based on the ability approach of emotional intelligence introduced by
Salovey and Mayer (1990). Here, the German translation was used (Schütz,
Hertel, & Schröder, 2002). It entails 141 items measuring eight subscales;
two four each branch: emotional perception, emotional facilitation, emo-
tional understanding, and emotional management. The test scores are cal-
culated based on a consensus-scoring of an accumulated German sample
(N=295). Internal consistencies of the branches were α = .88 for percep-
tion, α = .67 for facilitation, α = .68 for understanding and α = .54 for
management. Mayer et al. (2003) claim, that the MSCEIT items were het-
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erogeneous and that consistencies underestimate the reliability as opposed
to retests.
Personality was measured with the Big Five Inventory (BFI, Lang, Luedtke,
& Asendorpf, 2001). It measures neuroticism, extraversion, conscientious-
ness, agreeableness, and openness with 42 items in five to ten minutes. Addi-
tionally, trait anxiety was measured using the German version of the State-
Trait-Anxiety-Inventory (STAI, Laux, Glanzmann, Schaffner, & Spielberger,
1981). The scale consists of 20 items and takes approximately 5 minutes.
Emotional Predictions. The participants were asked to imagine the up-
coming social science test and predict how they themselves and the average
classmate will feel immediately before the test, after, and one hour later.
The ratings were conducted with 10 affective adjectives on a scale ranging
from 1 (not at all) to 5 (absolutely). These adjectives were intended to
cover a variety of possible affective reactions. The multidimensional state
questionnaire (MBDF, Steyer, Schwenkmezger, Notz, & Eid, 1997) measures
three affective dimensions: valence, tranquility and wakefulness. These di-
mensions can be compared to the affective aspect of stress as measured with
the Distress Scale of the DSSQ (Matthews et al., 2002). For each dimension,
the two items with the highest part-whole correlations were chosen. Valence
is represented by happy and unsatisfied (cf. hedonic tone); tranquility by
calm and nervous (cf. tense arousal); and wakefulness by awake and tired
(cf. energetic arousal). Additionally, the subjects predicted four relevant
emotional categories, namely anger, pride, anxiety, and sadness.
Accuracy of emotional predictions was calculated in terms of bias and
correspondence of the predictions to the experiences (see Section 3.2). An
oblimin principal axis analysis over the aggregated experience scores shows
a strong first factor. A general affective index accounts for 38.19% of the
variance with a consistency of α = .83. A two factor solution explains 47.7%
of the variance and divides the affective adjectives into positive affect (pride,
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relaxed, happy, calm) and negative affect (anxious, unsatisfied, nervous,
angry, sad and tired). Those factors intercorrelated with −.23 and had a
consistency of .64 for positive affect and .84 for negative affect.
Emotional Experiences. Emotional experiences were measured as self
reports with the same 10 affective adjectives. Experiences of the general
other were calculated as the mean experience per item.
Coping. Coping was measured using six of the 20 subscales of the ques-
tionnaire for coping with stress (SVF 78, Janke & Erdmann, 2002). Each
of these subscales contained six items on a 5-point scale. The standard in-
struction asks for coping with stressors in general. Here, participants were
asked how they handle stress in regard to the upcoming exams. The authors
propose a distinction between positive and negative strategies in terms of
attenuation and enhancement of stress. Following this logic, the conducted
subscales represent four positive strategies (positive self-instruction, playing
down, tone down, and reaction control) and two negative ones (resignation,
rumination). Sample items are given in Table 3.2. An oblimin principal axis
analysis of the scale scores supports a slightly different two factor solution
with 66.88% variance explanation. Here, playing down (reversely coded)
shifts to the negative strategies. The factor intercorrelation between posi-
tive and negative strategies is .16, all communalities are between .58 − .79
and all loadings are over .70. Indices of positive and negative coping are
calculated accordingly 3.2. Internal consistencies are α = .74 and α = .71.
Distress prior to the Exams. This distress measure was measured in-
dependently from predictions and experiences in anticipation of the exams.
The already described shortened version of the MBDF (Steyer et al., 1997)
was conducted one week prior to the exams in order to measure valence,
tranquility, and calmness. The one-factor solution in an oblimin principal
axis analysis accounts for 53.10 % of the variance and the consistency of this
index is α=.87.
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Table 3.2: Sample Items for Positive and Negative Coping
Scale Sample Item
Positive Strategies
Positive Self-Instruction I tell myself that I won’t give up.
Reaction Controll I try to pull myself together.
Tone Down I tell myself that it is nothing to worry about.
Negative Strategies
Playing Down (reverse coded) I manage the situation better than most others.
Rumination I tend to think about it over and over.
Resignation I tend to give up quickly.
Note. Own translation.
Satisfaction with Grades. Participants received their grade in the social
science test in January. They rated the satisfaction with their grade on a
five-point scale.
3.2 Results
First, descriptive statistics and first order correlations of the conducted tests
and ratings are presented. Then, repeated measures ANOVA is used to
evaluate the data in terms of the affective forecasting paradigm (Gilbert
et al., 1998). Then, individual differences in the accuracy of emotional
predictions are explored. After addressing validity and adaptive value of
bias, correspondence as profile similarity will be examined.
3.2.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.3 presents the intercorrelations and descriptive statistics of the con-
ducted measurements. For predictions and experiences composite scores are
reported1 However, the correlational pattern is comparable when positive
1The correlation between positive and negative affect is r=.52 for predictions and r=.46
for experiences. Different points of time (before, after, later) correlate with a range of
r=.66 to r=.82 for predictions and r=.55 to r=.66 for experiences.
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and negative affect are distinguished. The relationship between predicted
and experienced affect is fairly high, already indicating substantial corre-
spondence. Also, as expected in terms of discriminant validity, one’s own
experiences are more closely related to the predictions for the self than to
those for others.
As to be expected, participants who predict more positive emotional ex-
periences score lower on neuroticism and state anxiety. Those predictions
are given in a better mood, and they are associated with less negative coping
strategies and less distress. Positive coping strategies are unrelated. This
pattern repeats itself to a lesser degree with predictions for others. Also,
more positive predictions for others are associated with higher overall emo-
tional intelligence. Emotional intelligence scores are higher for women and
intelligence scores higher for men. Coping strategies are related to distress
and higher emotional intelligence goes along with higher satisfaction with
the grade.
When predictions for different points of time are distinguished, relation-
ships to personality and mood are comparable. Only the correlation to cop-
ing is stronger for earlier points of time, i.e. participants with more positive
coping strategies expect to feel better, especially before and immediately
after the test.
3.2.2 Forecasts and Experiences over Time
The course of predictions and experiences over time is examined with a 3x2
repeated measures ANOVA, treating time (before, after, later) and type
(prediction, experience) as factors, and emotional ratings as outcomes (see
Figure 3.1). Positive and negative affect are distinguished because they are
distinguished in affective forecasting research (Gilbert et al., 2002, 1998).
The within subjects effects and the contrasts are presented in Table 3.4.
Repeated contrasts are reported for time and simple contrasts for type. Time
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Figure 3.1: Course of Predictions and Experiences (N = 128 - 141)
(before, after, later) has a significant main effect. Positive affect increases
and negative affect decreases over time for both transitions before vs. after
and after vs. later. Only for positive affect, there is a main effect for type
(predictions, experiences), i.e. predictions are better than experiences.
The interaction of time and type is significant for positive and negative
affect. This is mainly due to predictions and experiences drifting apart for
later predictions. Specifically, participants expect better feelings after an
exam than they experience. For positive affect, this is due to the first time
transition. It is already overestimated after the test and again one hour later.
One’s own negative affect is overestimated before the test, rather accurately
predicted after, and underestimated one hour later. This replicates the
findings of Gilbert et al. (1998) that negative affect decreases faster than
expected (η = .06). Also, negative affect predictions for others are generally
worse than predictions for the self. They are even worse than the actual
experiences.
3.2.3 Accuracy as Bias
As previously stated, accuracy can be conceptualized as bias (i.e. Euclidean
distance) and correspondence (i.e. profile correlation between predictions
and experiences). In terms of the accuracy components of Cronbach (1955),
bias as Euclidean distance is analogous to elevation. After examining the
mean differences between forecasts and experiences, individual differences
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Table 3.4: Repeated-measures ANOVA and Contrasts with Positive and Negative Affect
as Outcome Variables
Source of variance F df η
Positive affect
Time 120.66∗∗∗ 1.83 .51
Before vs After 104.99∗∗∗ 1 .48
After vs Delayed 18.66∗∗∗ 1 .14
Type 5.41∗ 1 .05
Time x Type 6.95∗∗ 1.95 .06
Before vs. After x
Forecast vs. Experience 10.59∗∗ 1 .8
After vs. Delayed x
Forecast vs. Experience .42 1 <.01
Negative affect
Time 123.39∗∗∗ 1.78 .52
Before vs After 62.71∗∗∗ 1 .35
After vs Delayed 86.53∗∗∗ 1 .43
Type .25 1 <.01
Time x Type 9.56∗∗∗ 1.25 .08
Before vs. After x
Forecast vs. Experience 2.86 1 .02
After vs. Delayed x
Forecast vs. Experience 7.69∗∗ 1 .06
Note. Results are corrected following Greenhouse-Geisser. Contrasts for type are not
reported because it has two levels: predictions and experiences.
* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001, two tailed
in accuracy are explored. For each participant a bias score is calculated as
the Euclidean distance, i.e. the sum of squared differences. Correlations are
given in Table 3.5. Euclidean distances disregard whether affect is over- or
underestimated, and they accentuate larger deviations. In contrast, simple
differences are sensitive to over- and underestimation. Higher simple differ-
ences indicate overestimation of positive affect, i.e. the predicted affect is
better than the experienced one.
Results show that bias is higher for women and for participants with
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higher trait anxiety and neuroticism. Also, it is associated with more neg-
ative coping and distress. Interestingly, emotionally perceptive participants
show a higher bias. This relationship is partly due to shared variance be-
tween emotional perception and neuroticism (r = .19, see Table 3.3). For
simple differences, the correlational pattern is distinct, and the correlations
are weaker in general. Higher simple differences, i.e. experting better affect
than is experienced, is associated to low neuroticism, better mood, and less
negative coping strategies. Also, older participants tend to expect better
affect than they experience.
When different points of time (before, after, later) are distinguished,
correlational patterns are similar. The correlations, however, tend to be
stronger for later predictions. Also, gender is not associated to bias for the
before prediction but to predictions for subsequent points of time (−.21 for
after, −.28 for later, p < .01).
To examine incremental validity of bias over and above intelligence and
personality, hierarchical regression analyses are conducted with the criteria
as outcome variables. In a first step, age, gender, intelligence, and per-
sonality were entered in the regression equation. In a second step, bias
was added2. The inclusion of bias did not improve the prediction of pos-
itive coping (β = .02,∆R2 < .01, p = .84) or satisfaction with the grade
(β = −.10,∆R2 < .01, p = .34). It does show incremental validity in pre-
dicting negative coping and stress. Initially, negative coping is best pre-
dicted with low neuroticism (R2 = .36, p<.001). Bias improves the model
(β = .22,∆R2 = .04, p = .01) in that low bias is related to less negative
coping over and above other abilities and traits. For distress the model
improvement is also significant. Low bias is incrementally related to less
distress (β = .20,∆R2 = .04, p = .02). In contrast, the simple difference
scores improve none of the models (all ∆R2 < .01, p > .13).
2Trait anxiety was not included because of high covariation with neuroticism. If anxiety
is entered instead of neuroticism, results are similar.
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Table 3.5: First-order Correlations of Difference Scores and Criteria
Bias Simple Differencea
Age -.10 .19*
Genderb -.27** -.03
Intelligence .03 -.09
Emotional Intelligence
Overall .25** -.13
Perception .28** -.08
Facilitation .16 -.11
Understanding .15 -.08
Management .14 -.15
Personality
State Anxiety .36*** -.15
Neuroticism .32*** -.19*
Extraversion -.04 .02
Conscientiousness -.12 .12
Agreeableness -.10 .04
Openness .11 -.07
Mood while Forecasting -.19* .21*
Coping
Positive Strategies -.17 .05
Negative Strategies .36*** -.20*
Distress .30*** -.14
Satisfaction with Grade -.06 -.16
Note. Bias is log-transformed to reach normality.
a High simple differences indicate that participants predict better affect
than they experience.
b Positive correlations with gender indicate higher values for males.
* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001, two tailed
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Figure 3.2: Anxiety as a Moderator of the Relationship between Bias and Coping
Anxiety as a moderator of the relationship between bias and criteria is
explored by adding an interaction term. For negative affect, the relation-
ship between bias and negative coping is moderated by anxiety (R2=.24,
∆R2=.04 for the interaction term, p < .05). Figure 3.2 clarifies the nature
of this interaction. For low anxiety individuals, lower bias is associated with
less negative coping. High anxiety participants show negative coping regard-
less of a high or low bias in their predictions. A similar interaction effect can
be found for distress (R2=.2, ∆ R2=.03 for the interaction term, p < .05)
but not for positive coping and satisfaction (all ∆R2<.01, all p > .39).
3.2.4 Accuracy as Correspondence
In terms of the accuracy components of Cronbach (1955), correspondence is
a composite measure that can be corrected for stereotype accuracy and differ-
ential elevation accuracy in order to obtain differential accuracy. Stereotype
accuracy captures the accuracy as to the mean answers for certain emotions,
e.g. that people are generally more nervous and less calm. Differential El-
evation Accuracy describes the accuracy as to the prediction of a response
biases for certain targets, e.g. that someone is generally in a worse mood
than others. Differential accuracy means the accuracy due to unique predic-
tions for certain targets on certain emotions, e.g. that someone will be tired
and nervous, as opposed to others). The second study of this thesis allows
for the full decomposition of accuracy but the current design limits it. Since
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there is only one specific target (the self), differential elevation accuracy can
not be examined. Stereotype accuracy, however, can be calculated as the
correspondence of predictions with the mean profile of experiences.
Correspondence is calculated using a multilevel modeling approach (Rau-
denbush & Bryk, 2002; Kreft & de Leeuw, 1998) and the software HLM 6.0
(Raudenbush, Bryk, Cheong, & Congdon, 2004). For accuracy estimates
that are sample independent, forecast were group-mean centered (Kreft, de
Leeuw, & Aiken, 1995) and person characteristics were grand mean centered.
The parameter estimates are comparable to unstandardized regression coef-
ficients. They are therefore not directly comparable. One of the main prob-
lems in interpreting multilevel models, is that error variance is not stable.
With the addition of a new parameter, this variance can change. Standard-
ization of variables is therefore not recommended (Nezlek, 2001). For effect
size estimates, proportion reduction of error is available and comparable to
∆R2. Also, the deviance test can be used to evaluate comparative model
fit.
Correspondence reflects how profiles of affective states can be accurately
predicted. In the HLM model, the data is treated as hierarchically nested.
Specifically, measures (level 1) are nested within persons (level 2). The
emotional experiences (EXP) are treated as the dependent variable in a
series of multilevel random coefficient models. The basic model is referred
to as the unrestricted model (see Equation 3.1a for level 1 and Equation
3.1b for level 2).
EXPij = β0j + rij (3.1a)
Here, EXPij is the emotional experience of person i on measurement j.
β0j is the random intercept coefficient for person j across the measures and
rij represents the error component of the measures j for person i. Basically,
it is assumed that each person has a different mean of emotional experiences
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that is estimated with β0j . In multilevel modeling, β0j can vary between
individuals. This is modeled as a random error component on level 2 (u0j),
i.e. the person level.
β0j = γ00 + u0j (3.1b)
In Equation 3.1b, β0j , as the known intercept component of level 1 is
predicted by a general mean of experiences (γ00) and a person specific error
component (u0j).
As shown in Table 3.6, the mean experience is estimated as 3.43 on a
scale from 1 to 5 with high scores indicating positive feelings. The variance
in the measures is 1.25 (SD = 1.12) and person level variance in emotion
ratings is .21 (SD = .46). This means that within-measures variance ac-
counted for approximately 83% of the overall variance which corresponds
to an intraclass correlation of .17. This indicates considerable variability of
emotion ratings but still dependency in the measures due to persons. The
average reliability estimate (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002, p. 49) for the mean
personal experience is .75.
Table 3.6: One-way ANOVA with Random Effects. Unrestricted Model
Fixed effect Coefficient SE t Ratio p Value
Average personal experience, γ00 3.43 .05 66.66 <.001
Random effect Variance component df χ2 p Value
of personal experience, u0j .21 111 459.87 <.001
of level 1 (measures), rij 1.25
Correspondence between predictions and experiences can be evaluated
when predictions (P) are used to estimate experiences:
EXPij = β0j + β1jPij + rij (3.2a)
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β0j = γ00 + u0j (3.2b)
β1j = γ10 + u1j (3.2c)
Here, both the intercept (β0j) and the slope of the predictions (β1j) are
modeled as random on level 2 (3.2b, 3.2c), i.e. they are allowed to vary
for each person. The results of this model are given in Table 3.7. The
fixed effects part of the results shows a similar intercept to the unrestricted
model3. The average prediction-experience-slope is .554. This indicates
that forecasts which are one point higher on a five point scale are associated
with experiences that are increased by .55. Both intercept and slope are
significantly different from zero. The random effects in this model represent
the variances of mean experiences and prediction-experience-slopes across
the participants. There is considerable variability in both the intercepts
and the slopes. This is necessary in order to relate this variability to other
traits.
The random effect on level 1, or residual variance, drops from 1.25 in the
unrestricted model to .84 after the inclusion of predictions. This proportion
of reduction of error (PRE) that is due to the inclusion of predictions is
approximately 33% which indicates considerable improvement of the model.
Reliability estimates are .84 for the intercept and .41 for the slope. Slopes
generally show lower reliability and values over .2 are called sufficient by
Raudenbush and Bryk (2002).
The next step is to take a look at moderators of accuracy, i.e. whether
certain person characteristics lead to a higher correspondence between pre-
dictions and experiences. Such characteristics are modeled on the level 2
(person) to estimate person-specific intercepts β0j and slopes β1j . For the
example of gender (GEN), following model is estimated:
3The intercept estimate does not change since the predictions are group-centered, i.e.
centered for each person.
4The slope coefficient can be interpreted as an unstandardized regression coefficient.
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Table 3.7: Estimating Experiences with Predictions
Fixed effect Coefficient SE t Ratio p Value
Mean personal experience, γ00 3.42 .05 66.43 <.001
Mean prediction-experience-slope, γ00 .55 .03 20.55 <.001
Random effect Variance component df χ2 p Value
Personal experience, u0j .24 104 666.22 <.001
Forecast-experience-slope, u1j .03 104 182.65 <.001
level 1 (measures), rij .84
EXPij = β0j + β1jPij + rij (3.3a)
β0j = γ00 + γ01GEN + u0j (3.3b)
β1j = γ10 + γ11GEN + u1j (3.3c)
Such a model is called intercepts-and-slopes-as-outcomes model because
both intercept and slope are predicted with level 2 variables. A significant
parameter γ01 indicates that gender relates to the mean affective experi-
ence, whereas a significant parameter γ11 indicates that gender moderates
the strength of the relationship between forecast and experience, i.e. the
accuracy in terms of correspondence.
Table 3.8 summarizes the results for a series of models, testing one mod-
erator at a time. The significance tests are comparable to those of correla-
tions but the coefficients are not standardized. Only emotional perception
is associated with the prediction-experience slope. Beyond that, correspon-
dence does not significantly relate to the available intelligence and person-
ality measures. Also, it does not relate to satisfaction with the achieved
grade, coping, or distress in the examination phase.
To evaluate the moderators in context and to further investigate the
role of emotional perception, hierarchical intercepts-and-slopes-as-outcomes
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Table 3.8: Moderators of Correspondence
Moderator Fixed Slope Coefficient % PREa in slope variance
Age <.01 .2
Genderb -.06 <.1
Emotional Intelligence
Perception .93* 14.7*
Facilitation .62 2.2
Understanding .33 1.1
Management .28 .8
Overall .92 5.9
Intelligence <.01 <.1
Personality
State Anxiety <.01 .2
Neuroticism <.01 <.1
Extraversion <.01 .5
Conscientiousness <.01 .2
Agreeableness <.01 1.6
Openness <.01 <.1
Coping
Positive Strategies <.01 .9
Negative Strategies <.01 .5
Mood while forecasting
General Index (Pos) -.04 <.1
Satisfaction with grade <.01 <.1
Distress Exams .05 4.7
a Proportion of reduction of error compared to the model without moderator.
b Positive correlations with gender indicate higher values for males.
* p < .05, two tailed
models are conducted. First, age, gender, intelligence, and personality are
used as predictors (step 1). Then, emotional perception is added (step 2).
Again, state anxiety is omitted because of its large covariation with neu-
roticism. When the intercepts are outcomes, neuroticism is again a strong
predictor of mean negative experience. Furthermore, openness covaries with
better experiences, and males tend to report slightly better affect than
females. Emotional perception however does not add to that prediction.
When the slopes are outcomes (i.e. the correspondence between predictions
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and experiences), age, gender, intelligence, and personality are again unre-
lated. Here, emotional perception as an additional predictor is significant
(b = 1.15, t = 2.920, p < .01). It reduces the error variance in the slopes
considerably (PRE= 17.3 %) and leads to significant model improvement
(χ2(2) = 9.523, p = .009).
Stereotype accuracy refers to the correspondence between predictions
and mean experiences. When correspondence is adjusted for stereotype ac-
curacy, mean experiences are subtracted from the experiences, and mean
predictions are subtracted from the predictions. Then, correspondence is
again calculated. When emotional perception is used to predict this ad-
justed correspondence, the parameter is nonsignificant (b < .01, t < .01)
and does not lead to model improvement (χ2(1) < .001, p > .5). This indi-
cates that emotional perception, as measured in the MSCEIT, is associated
with higher correspondence due to a match with the stereotypic profile (i.e.
the mean profile).
The last step is to evaluate the adaptive value of correspondence as to
coping, distress, and satisfaction. Multilevel random coefficient modeling
only allows for dependent variables on level 1. Therefore these criteria can-
not be formally regressed on. Still, the covariation between correspondence
and criteria can be evaluated when criteria are modeled as moderators of
the prediction-experience slope. Table 3.9 shows the results. Negative cop-
ing, distress, and low satisfaction significantly predict worse experience (see
intercepts-as-outcomes), but none of these characteristics is associated with
a higher correspondence (see slopes-as-outcomes) Thus, there is no evidence
that high correspondence is adaptive.
Again, anxiety is addressed as a moderator for the relationship between
criteria and correspondence. An interaction term is implemented on level
2 (cf. Preacher, Curran, & Bauer, 2006), and for the example of distress
(DIS) following model is estimated:
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Table 3.9: Adaptability of Correspondence
Fixed effects Coefficient t ratio
Intercepts-as-Outcomes
Intercept 3.42∗∗∗ 77.53
Age −.01 −1.66
Gendera .20∗ 2.39
Positive Coping −.00 −.15
Negative Coping −.04∗ −2.42
Distress −.12∗ −2.03
Satisfaction .12∗∗ 2.75
Slopes-as-Outcomes
Intercept .55∗∗∗ 20.98
Age <.01 .14
Gender −.02 −.41
Positive Coping −.01 −.93
Negative Coping −.01 −1.36
Distress .05 1.27
Satisfaction .01 .60
a Positive effects with gender indicate higher values for males.
* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001, two tailed
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Figure 3.3: Relationship between Emotional Predictions (x) and Experiences (y) for
High and Low Anxiety, and High and Low Positive Coping
EXPij = β0j + β1jPij + rij (3.4a)
β0j = γ00 + γ01ANX + γ02DIS + γ03ANXxDIS + u0j (3.4b)
β1j = γ10 + γ11ANX + γ12DIS + γ13ANXxDISu1j (3.4c)
The term γ13 is tested for the interactions between anxiety and each of
the criteria (positive coping, negative coping, distress, and satisfaction). Re-
sults show a significant interaction for anxiety and positive coping (b < −.01,
t = −2.32, p = .02, see Figure 3.3). For high anxiety individuals, less cor-
respondence relates to higher positive coping, again due to correspondence
with the stereotypic experience. In other words, when trait anxiety is high,
not predicting the course of emotions that everyone else does is beneficial.
For low trait anxiety, in contrast, high positive coping is associated with
better experiences (y) but unrelated to correspondence. For the other crite-
ria, interactions with anxiety are not significant (negative coping: b < .01,
t = .31, p = .76, distress: b < .01, t = .73, p = .47, satisfaction with
the grade: b < .01, t = −1.04, p = .30). Thus, anxious participants with
higher correspondence do not show more or less negative coping, distress,
or satisfaction with the grade than non-anxious and accurate participants.
Chapter 3. Study 1: Anxiety Study 40
3.3 Discussion
The main research question is the nature (3.3.1) and adaptive value (3.3.2)
of accuracy of emotional predictions in terms of a low bias and high corre-
spondence. Then, the findings will be connected to the affective forecasting
paradigm (3.3.3).
3.3.1 Bias, Correspondence, and other Abilities and Traits
Predictions and experiences, as the basis of accuracy, are strongly related
to mood and personality and rather unrelated to intelligence or emotional
intelligence. Not surprisingly, anxious participants and participants in a
bad mood predicted worse affective responses to the test. Mood guides the
retrieval from memory and activates aspects of the self that are mood con-
gruent (f.e. Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). The imagination of the upcoming
test itself could not have influenced the mood since mood was measured
before the emotional predictions were introduced.
Accuracy is distinguished as to bias and correspondence. Lower bias is
unrelated to intelligence, relates to personality in terms of lower trait anxi-
ety and neuroticism. It was not related to emotional understanding but to
emotional perception. Moreover, higher emotional perception was related
to a higher bias or larger deviations between predictions and experiences.
Common variance between emotional perception and neuroticism/anxiety5
can explain this relationship (see Table 3.3). Still, this undermines the as-
sumption of low bias as a proxy measure of emotional intelligence in general,
or emotional understanding in particular. There is, however, another study
that links emotional perception to stress for social service workers (Ciarrochi,
Dean, & Anderson, 2002). If emotional perception can be maladaptive, it
should be in a context that elicits negative responses. The simple differ-
5This relationship is specific to the sample at hand. A current meta-analysis reports a
mean correlation between emotional perception and emotional stability of .12 (Joseph &
Newman, 2010).
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ences show better discriminant validity to personality but no substantial
associations to EI either.
Correspondence shows slightly better construct validity. It was unre-
lated to intelligence, as well, but also unrelated to personality traits and
positively associated with emotional perception. Specifically, stereotype ac-
curacy, i.e. the correspondence of predictions to mean affective profiles is
higher for emotionally perceptive individuals. This indicates that a focus on
correspondence might be better suited to reflect an ability as to emotions.
However, the relationship to emotional understanding is also not signifi-
cant. In sum, emotionally perceptive individuals accentuate the intensity
compared to the sample mean (which leads to higher bias), but they are
better in predicting the constellation of different affective dimensions and
different points of time.
3.3.2 The Adaptability of Bias and Correspondence
Low bias is in fact adaptive and predicts lower distress and less negative
coping, even incrementally to intelligence and personality. Also, it is a
stronger predictor of criteria than the simple difference score. It is not just
about an optimistic view but about accurate knowledge of intensity, also
over time. However, low bias as to an anxiety-eliciting situation does not
relate to criteria of positive affective value, like improved satisfaction with
the grade or more positive coping.
Trait anxiety moderates the relationship between bias and negative cop-
ing. Participants with high anxiety show negative coping anyway. For low
anxiety individuals, though, lower bias is beneficial in terms of e.g. less
rumination and resignation. This supports the conclusion that the conse-
quences of accuracy are person-specific. In contrast, simple difference scores
are not incrementally valid to personality. Their relations to criteria can be
explained with shared variance. The notion to overestimate negative affect
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in part reflects anxiety.
Correspondence is not generally adaptive but anxiety serves as a moder-
ator again. High anxiety individuals with lower correspondence show more
positive coping. Thus, low accuracy in terms of correspondence (or more
specifically low stereotype accuracy) is beneficial for this subgroup. High
correspondence means to know about the profile of emotions that is likely
to arise. Here, this also involves knowing how they develop over time. Basi-
cally, emotions are rank ordered as to their intensity. Accurately predicting
the course of the emotions seems to be maladaptive for anxious participants.
This supports the hypothesis of Gilbert et al. (2002) that errors can be use-
ful and that our view on the temporal progression of emotions should be
distorted. Under certain conditions, this seems to be that case.
3.3.3 Connection to the Affective Forecasting Paradigm
When forecasts and experiences are examined on a group level, there is clear
evidence for immune neglect (Gilbert et al., 1998). Obviously, participants
underestimate mood repair processes that occur after the exam. In addition,
positive affect after the event was overestimated. This can also enhance
motivation and help to achieve one’s goals.
On a group level, there is evidence for a general bias. A focus on in-
terindividual differences, though, shows that the bias should not be as high
as possible. Lower bias was related to less distress and less negative coping,
even more so for the after and later predictions. Also, accurate predictions
are again preferable to over- or underestimation as reflected in the simple
difference scores. Dunn et al. (2007) already suggested that higher affective
forecasting accuracy relates to ability EI, especially emotional management.
They, however, used the simple differences on a nine-point scale as a mea-
sure of accuracy. Given the results of the current study, it seems possible
that these correlations are at least partly due to personality and not incre-
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mentally valid.
Correspondence in the anxiety study captured how well the predicted
emotional transitions for different affective dimensions matched the experi-
enced ones. Results suggest that high anxiety individuals cope better with
less knowledge about the transitions. This can be explained with motivated
distortions (Gilbert et al., 2002). Playing down the negative impact of the
test situation leads to a smaller drop of negative affect after the test which
reduces correspondence.
In this study, the focus was on the self as the target of prediction. Given
the impact of anxiety on the accuracy-criterion relationship, the examination
of other targets seems crucial. Affective forecasting research emphasizes
biases in the prediction of one’s own future emotional states. Emotional
intelligence, however, claims that emotional knowledge should be employed
for self and others and the measurement of emotional understanding includes
a test that uses vignettes for hypothetical others. The following study will
focus on the social aspect of emotional predictions.
Chapter 4
Study 2: Work-Group Study
4.1 Methods
4.1.1 Sample
The study was conducted with psychology freshman at Humboldt-University
Berlin. The subjects were participants of an empirical observation course
in two consecutive years. The aim of the course was to gain experience in
empirical research. Students were expected to plan, conduct, and analyze
observational data in study groups of 3-6 participants. Data was collected
over the course of the semester, i.e. approximately over 6 months. There
was sample attrition due to discontinuation of the course or of the under-
graduate studies. 207 students in 43 groups completed the course, 102 in 21
groups in the first year and 105 in 22 groups in the second year. 78.2 % were
female with a mean age of 22.9 (SD = 5.55, range = 18 - 50). Participation
was rewarded with detailed feedback on the conducted tests and credits for
partaking in an empirical study. The compliance with the study require-
ments was good in general, although there was a considerable amount of
missing data due to nonattendance in certain waves of the data collection.
The N for different measures varied from 158 to 180 in 43 groups. Peer
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ratings were available for 195 students.
4.1.2 Design and Procedure
Students were randomly assigned to work groups in order to prevent self-
selection based on mutual affection. The random procedure also promoted
zero acquaintance (cf. Kenny, 1994) in the work groups to avoid advantages
as to peer predictions. Accordingly, none of the group members knew an-
other member longer than for two weeks. First, participants took standard-
ized psychometric tests under the supervision of an investigator. During the
semester, the students completed questionnaires that asked for emotional
predictions regarding relationship variables and their collaboration in the
group. Participants were allowed to complete the questionnaires at home
and return them to a mailbox at university. The ratings followed a round
robin design, meaning that everyone answered each question for every other
member of the work group. This way, different specific targets of predictions
can be distinguished. Also, teacher ratings for performance and the grade
of the term paper were available.
4.1.3 Material
This study was part of a larger research cooperation that also analyzed per-
sonality development. In the second year of the study, some questionnaires
had to be shortened due to time constraints in the course. For the current
thesis, the following tests and questionnaires are relevant.
Psychometric tests. Intelligence was measured with the short version of
the Berlin Structure of Intelligence Test (BIS-K IV, Jäger, Süß, & Beauducel,
1997) that lasts approximately 45 minutes. Each item belongs to a certain
content domain (verbal, numerical, and spatial) and to a certain operational
domain (capacity, memory, speed, and creativity). A test score for general
intelligence and for intellectual capacity can be calculated. General knowl-
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edge was measured with a shortened version of the knowledge test avail-
able in the Intelligence-Structure-Test 2000R (IST-2000, Amthauer, Brocke,
Liepmann, & Beauducel, 2001). For the shortened version, the 18 items
with the highest part-whole-correlation were selected. Every correct item
was awarded with one point. A maximum of 18 points was attainable.
Emotional intelligence was measured with the MSCEIT V2.0, an instru-
ment that represents the ability approach of emotional intelligence. Here,
four branches of emotional intelligence are distinguished, namely emotional
perception, emotional facilitation, emotional understanding and emotional
management. The test was consensus-scored based on a German sample
with approximately 400 participants.
Personality was measured using the BIG5 inventory (BFI, Lang et al.,
2001). It contains 42 items to measure neuroticism, extraversion, conscien-
tiousness, agreeableness, and openness. It takes approximately 5-10 minutes
to administer.
Emotional predictions. Emotional predictions regarding mutual feelings
at the end of the term where conducted twice. First, the questionnaire was
completed with roughly a month of acquaintance and during the planing
stages of the student project. It was repeated after another eight weeks and
with more experience of collaboration. Retest reliability can be calculated.
Here, emotional predictions focus on the relationship development in the
work groups. Participants predicted affection, satisfaction with the collab-
oration, anger, and fun that every group member was going to experience
with every other member at the end of the term (when presentations for
the project were due). Anger and fun were rated on 5-point scales (1: not
at all to 5: absolutely), affection and satisfaction with the collaboration on
6-point bipolar scales (dislikable to likable, and unsatisfied to satisfied).
Emotional experiences. At the end of the term, after the presentations,
experiences were measured analogously. Every group member reported on
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their actual feelings towards every other member of the group as to affection,
satisfaction with the collaboration, anger, and fun.
Relationship measures. In the beginning and at the end of the semester,
participants were asked to rate their relationship to the other group members
in detail. In the current analysis, the ratings at the end of the semester are
used as criteria. The items were administered in the same questionnaire as
the emotional experiences. Measures of task and relationship conflict were
adopted from Jehn (1995) and slightly rephrased in order to address individ-
uals instead of groups. The original item asked whether there were personal
difficulties in the team. The adapted version asked for personal difficulties
with a specific person. Each type of conflict was measured with four items
on a 5-point scale (none to a lot). Items for relationship conflict covered the
amount of friction, personal conflict, tension, and emotional conflict. Task
conflict contained disagreements, conflict of ideas, conflict about work and
differences of opinion. An oblimin factor analysis of confirmed two factors
that account for 71.6 % of the variance (56.3 for relationship conflict and an
additional 15.3 for task conflict)1. The factor intercorrelation is r = .45.
Four additional items were administered, asking for friendship (s/he is
my friend, I spend spare time with him/her) and competency (s/he did
good work, s/he is competent as to what we do). Items were rated on a
5-point scale (no to absolutely). In an oblimin factor analysis, the scales are
well distinguished with a factor intercorrelation of .02. Both scales account
for 83.14 % of the variance, with 57.45 % for friendship and 25.68 % for
competence.
For each team member a peer rating of task conflict, relationship conflict,
friendship, and competence was calculated as the mean rating of all fellow
work group members.
Teacher ratings of the term paper. Several ratings were available to as-
1The analyses were performend on an aggregated level, i.e. for 43 groups in order to
avoid dependency in the data
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sess the quality of the term paper. Teachers rated the paper for quality of
depiction, style, completeness and thoughtfulness on a 6-point scale with
higher scores indicating better performance. Also, papers were graded on a
six point scale. Oblimin principal axis analysis on the group level (N = 43)
strongly supported one factor that accounts for 83.72 % of the variance. A
composite score was calcualted, and higher ratings indicate better perfor-
mance.
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4.2 Results
Initially, first order correlations, descriptive statistics, and retest reliabilities
of emotional prediction accuracy will be addressed. Due to the round robin
design of the measurements, a complete decomposition of accuracy proposed
by Cronbach (1955) will be possible. This accuracy will be related to other
abilities and traits. The adaptive value of accuracy will be examined as to
peer ratings of friendship and competence, conflict, and quality of the term
paper.
The current design differs considerably from the anxiety study. Here,
participants are nested within groups. This dependency of data potentially
distorts the results when individuals are the unit of analysis2 (Kashy &
Kenny, 2000). Three strategies were applied to deal with group level vari-
ance. First, analyses were conservatively conducted on a group level (N=43).
A similar approach was taken in context of retest reliability. Since aggrega-
tion on a group level is likely to lead to overestimation of stability, random
subsamples of independent group members were drawn. Then, the range of
retest reliabilities was reported. Finally, multilevel modeling and variance
decomposition as to the social relation model (SRM, Kenny, 1994) were
used. SRM analyses are based on (Kenny & West, 2006) and were adapted
to the conditions at hand.
4.2.1 The Group as Unit of Analysis
4.2.1.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 4.1 presents intercorrelations and descriptive statistics for the main
variables of this study except accuracy measures. Means and standard de-
2The degree of dependency in the data can be estimated using the intraclass correlation
(ICC, Kenny, Mannetti, Pierro, Livi, & Kashy, 2002). As a rule of thumb, intraclass
correlations over .07 are critical. In this sample, intelligence and personality are, as to
be expected, fairly unrelated (ICC below .07). However, the criteria differ considerably
between groups (ICC up to .22).
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viations are based on the complete sample, intercorrelations are reported
on a group level (N=43). This controls the dependency in the data, but
it reduces the power of significance tests. Therefore, significant trends are
reported as well (p < .10).
Relationship conflict was rated very low with a mean of 1.58 on a 5 point
scale. Emotional understanding and emotional management, as measured
with the MSCEIT, relate to the general knowledge test, which supports the
assumption of EI as an ability with emotional knowledge being the prereq-
uisite of emotional management. Work groups with high mean emotional
understanding and management also show high mean knowledge. Person-
ality traits are rather unrelated to EI, with the exception of neuroticism,
which is again associated with perception and, moreover, with facilitation.
When predicting the criteria of work group success on a group level,
emotional understanding predicts the term paper rating. Emotional man-
agement is related to higher peer ratings of friendship, and facilitation to
higher peer ratings of competence. Personality traits are less successful
in predicting criteria. Still, in more conscientious groups, peer ratings of
competence are higher. In groups with high relationship conflict, mean mu-
tually perceived competence is lower (r=-.77, p<.001), and in groups with
high task conflict, there is also relationship conflict (r=.64, p<.001). The
term paper rating is rather independent from the peer ratings.
4.2.1.2 Bias and Correspondence
Table 4.2 summarizes retest reliabilities, descriptive statistics, and inter-
correlations for emotional experiences, predictions, bias, simple differences
and correspondence as profile correlations. The target of prediction (self vs
other) and the point of time (T1/T2) are differentiated. To avoid overesti-
mation of stability, retest reliabilities were not calculated on a group level.
Instead, 4 random subsamples were drawn and the range of the resulting
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reliabilities is reported. Bias and simple differences show good retest relia-
bility. Correspondence on the other hand is fairly stable for self predictions
and rather unstable for correspondence.
Intercorrelations are calculated on a group level which complicates the
interpretation of the effects, especially for forecasts, experiences, and simple
differences. The main focus is on the last four columns, namely accuracy
as bias and correspondence. Generally, accuracy of self-predictions is higher
in terms of both a low bias (2.13/1.51 as opposed to 2.73/2.68) and high
correspondence (.24/.27 as opposed to .44/.68). Also, only self-predictions
improve over time. In groups with high knowledge, later (not earlier) predic-
tions for the self are more accurate. At least partly, the higher later accuracy
for the self should be due to the fact that feelings towards others stabilize
in the early stages of the relationship. Hence, accuracy of self predictions is
improved because actual feelings at the time of the prediction are closer to
the target feelings.
EI scales, especially management and facilitation are mainly related to
the accuracy for the self which points to the need to further study EI in an
interpersonal context. The MSCEIT originally aims to capture an ability
in regard to the self and others. Extraversion goes along with less accuracy
for others, i.e. a higher bias and lower correspondence. Mean openness in
a group leads to a higher bias, and mean conscientiousness leads to more
accurate predictions for the self.
On a group level, low bias is related to positive peer ratings, with the
exception of friendship and task conflict. This is not limited to self predic-
tions. Low bias and higher correspondence for others is also adaptive (e.g.
to know who will like whom or who will be angry with whom). This is re-
markable given that correspondence for others can be unreliable. Accuracy
for the self is also related to better term paper ratings, accuracy for others
is not.
T
ab
le
4.
2:
R
et
es
t
R
el
ia
bi
lit
y
an
d
Va
lid
ity
of
A
cc
ur
ac
y
M
ea
su
re
s
(G
ro
up
Le
ve
l,
N
=
43
)
P
re
di
ct
io
n
T
1/
T
2
Si
m
pl
e
di
ff
er
en
ce
T
1/
T
2
B
ia
s
T
1/
T
2
C
or
re
sp
on
de
nc
e
T
1/
T
2
E
xp
er
ie
nc
e
Se
lf
O
th
er
Se
lf
O
th
er
Se
lf
O
th
er
Se
lf
O
th
er
R
et
es
t
re
lia
bi
lit
y
–
.2
4
-
.7
4
.2
6
-
.7
2
.3
7
-
.5
5
.5
3
-
.7
6
.3
8
-
.5
1
.6
0-
.7
4
.2
1
-
.4
9
-.
16
-
.5
8
A
ge
-.
03
-.
07
/-
.1
2
-.
15
/-
.0
8
-.
07
/-
.1
7
-.
04
/-
.0
0
.0
3/
.1
0
.0
7/
.1
2
.1
0/
.0
4
-.
04
/.
07
G
en
de
ra
-.
13
-.
19
/.
00
-.
02
/-
.1
3
-.
10
/.
22
.1
3/
.0
2
.2
4/
.2
4
.1
8/
-.
05
-.
01
/-
.1
5
-.
37
∗ /
.3
1∗
In
te
lli
ge
nc
e
-.
17
-.
16
/-
.1
4
-.
20
/-
.0
5
.1
2/
.1
2
.1
0/
.1
5
.0
1/
-.
17
.1
8/
.0
8
-.
18
/.
08
-.
12
/-
.1
3
K
no
w
le
dg
e
-.
12
-.
12
/-
.0
1
-.
12
/-
.1
5
.0
9/
.2
0
.1
3/
.0
9
-.
24
/-
.4
2∗
∗
-.
03
/-
.0
9
.0
2/
.2
9+
.0
3/
.0
5
E
I
O
ve
ra
ll
.2
3
.1
6/
.1
6
.1
7/
.0
3
-.
09
/-
.1
8
-.
13
/.
31
+
-.
24
/-
.2
5
-.
02
/.
03
.3
1∗
/.
40
∗∗
.1
6/
.2
0
E
I
P
er
ce
pt
io
n
.1
8
.1
7/
.0
9
.2
3/
-.
01
-.
08
/-
.2
2
-.
10
/-
.2
5
-.
09
/.
09
-.
15
/-
.0
1
.1
7/
.1
9
.0
4/
.2
7+
E
I
Fa
ci
lit
at
io
n
.4
2∗
∗
.4
3∗
∗ /
.2
8+
.4
1∗
∗ /
.3
0+
-.
10
/-
.3
3∗
*
-.
18
/-
.3
3∗
-.
17
/-
.0
7
.1
3/
.0
4
.3
9∗
/.
29
+
.1
3/
.2
2
E
I
U
nd
er
st
an
di
ng
-.
06
-.
08
/-
.0
5
-.
08
/-
.1
0
-.
01
/-
.0
2
-.
02
/-
.1
0
-.
01
/-
.1
7
-.
05
/-
.0
1
.0
2/
.1
1
.2
8+
/-
.0
7
E
I
M
an
ag
em
en
t
.1
7
.0
4/
.1
8
.0
2/
.0
0
-.
07
/.
01
-.
11
/-
.2
6
-.
39
∗ /
-.
50
∗∗
.0
9/
.1
1
.3
4∗
/.
51
∗∗
-.
05
/.
21
N
eu
ro
ti
ci
sm
.0
7
-.
06
/.
03
.0
2/
-.
09
-.
17
/.
02
-.
07
/-
.2
3
-.
08
/-
.0
2
-.
25
/.
09
.0
5/
.1
8
-.
00
/-
.2
5
E
xt
ra
ve
rs
io
n
-.
10
-.
13
/-
.0
4
-.
10
/-
.0
9
.0
4/
-.
08
.0
6/
.0
5
.0
8/
.1
6
.4
3∗
∗ /
.2
3
.2
6+
/-
.0
7
-.
34
∗ /
.1
6
C
on
sc
ie
nt
io
us
ne
ss
.2
7+
.1
8/
.2
7+
.2
5/
.1
8
-.
17
/-
.1
1
-.
09
/-
.0
9
-.
23
/-
.1
7
.1
3/
-.
05
.3
3∗
/.
19
-.
10
/.
33
∗
A
gr
ee
ab
le
ne
ss
-.
03
.1
3/
.0
6
.1
4/
.1
8
.1
9/
.1
0
.1
5/
.2
7+
.0
4/
.0
5
.1
3/
.0
7
-.
10
/-
.0
9
-.
13
/-
.0
7
O
pe
nn
es
s
-.
07
.1
9/
-.
07
.2
3/
.1
4
.2
6+
/-
.0
8
.2
1/
.1
9
.2
9+
/.
11
.4
3∗
∗ /
.3
0+
-.
02
/-
.0
5
-.
11
/.
06
T
as
k
co
nfl
ic
t
-.
48
∗∗
-.
37
∗ /
-.
52
∗∗
-.
38
∗ /
-.
56
∗∗
.2
4/
-.
14
.3
3∗
/.
07
.1
6/
-.
10
.2
1/
.4
9∗
∗
-.
01
/.
30
∗
-.
12
/-
.4
3∗
∗
R
el
at
io
ns
hi
p
co
nfl
ic
t
-.
77
∗∗
-.
45
∗∗
/-
.6
8∗
∗
-.
27
+
/-
.6
0∗
∗
.4
4∗
∗ /
.0
0
.6
4∗
∗ /
.2
7+
.5
1∗
∗ /
.4
2∗
∗
.4
5∗
∗ /
.6
8∗
∗
-.
12
/-
.1
2
-.
32
∗ /
-.
38
∗
Fr
ie
nd
sh
ip
.5
4∗
∗
.3
1∗
/.
53
∗∗
.1
1/
.4
2∗
∗
-.
17
/.
01
-.
50
∗∗
/-
.2
2
-.
23
/-
.2
7
.0
1/
-.
10
.0
7/
.3
2∗
-.
15
/-
.1
5
C
om
pe
te
nc
e
.8
4∗
∗
.6
4∗
∗ /
.6
5∗
∗
.5
3∗
∗
/.
64
∗∗
-.
31
∗ *
/-
.1
9
-.
54
∗∗
/-
.3
8∗
-.
46
∗∗
/-
.3
2∗
-.
31
∗ /
-.
57
∗∗
.2
2/
.0
6
.3
1∗
/.
28
+
T
er
m
pa
pe
rb
.0
6
-.
18
/.
02
-.
09
/-
.0
6
-.
26
+
/.
04
-.
13
/-
.2
2
-.
36
∗ /
-.
27
+
-.
26
/-
.2
6
.3
4*
/-
.0
3
.2
0/
.1
8
M
ea
n
4.
49
4.
48
/4
.5
3
4.
43
/4
.5
5
.0
1/
-.
01
-.
05
/.
03
2.
13
/1
.5
1
2.
73
/2
.6
8
.4
4/
.6
1
.2
4/
.2
7
SD
.6
9
.6
9/
.8
3
.4
9/
.5
9
.7
0/
.5
9
.6
4/
.6
3
1.
42
/1
.2
7
1.
16
/1
.3
1
.3
2/
.2
8
.2
3/
.2
5
N
ot
e.
H
ig
h
ex
pe
ri
en
ce
s
an
d
pr
ed
ic
ti
on
s
in
di
ca
te
m
or
e
aff
ec
ti
on
,
m
or
e
sa
ti
sf
ac
ti
on
w
it
h
th
e
co
lla
bo
ra
ti
on
,
le
ss
an
ge
r
an
d
m
or
e
fu
n.
H
ig
h
si
m
pl
e
di
ff
er
en
ce
s
in
di
ca
te
ov
er
es
ti
m
at
io
n,
i.e
.
pr
ed
ic
ti
on
s
ar
e
hi
gh
er
th
an
ex
pe
ri
en
ce
s.
P
re
di
ct
io
ns
T
1
w
er
e
co
nd
uc
te
d
w
it
h
on
e
m
on
th
of
ac
qu
ai
nt
an
ce
,
T
2
w
it
h
th
re
e
m
on
th
s.
a
P
os
it
iv
e
in
te
rc
or
re
la
ti
on
s
in
di
ca
te
hi
gh
er
va
lu
es
fo
r
m
al
es
.
b
H
ig
he
r
te
rm
pa
pe
r
ra
ti
ng
s
in
di
ca
te
be
tt
er
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
.
+
:p
<
.1
0
∗
:p
<
.0
5
∗∗
:p
<
.0
1,
tw
o-
ta
ile
d
Chapter 4. Study 2: Work-Group Study 54
The first three columns, experiences and predictions of group-related af-
fect are fairly unrelated to intelligence, knowledge and personality. There is
little association to conscientiousness, meaning that groups higher in consci-
entiousness have better average experiences and predictions. Since conscien-
tiousness was useful for goal attainment in the work groups, this association
seems plausible. Also, groups with higher facilitation, i.e. individuals who
can use or feel emotions, have higher predicted and experienced feelings.
The relationships of experiences and predictions to the criteria are rather
trivial. Groups with higher mean experience (in terms of affection, satisfac-
tion with the collaboration, fun, and absence of anger) report less relation-
ship conflict and perceive each other as friends and as competent. Generally,
experiences were positive with a mean score of 4.49 on a scale from 1 to 5.
4.2.1.3 Accuracy Decomposition
Profile correlations in a round robin design can be divided into four com-
ponents that are presented in Table 4.3. Results for elevation (i.e. bias)
can be found in Table 4.2. Stereotype accuracy means that the predictions
reflect how affective dimensions are generally rated. Differential elevation
indicates that the predictions accurately reflect differences between targets,
f.e. that a certain member in the group is accurately expected to cause
worse emotions than others. Differential accuracy is the accuracy adjusted
for elevation, stereotype accuracy and differential elevation. It reflects the
accuracy of predicting that certain people feel in a certain way, even if oth-
ers would not (Kenny & Winquist, 2001). A distinction as to the self and
others (as in Table 4.2 is not possible since different targets are needed for
the decomposition. Relationships to tests and criteria, as well as retest re-
liabilities are reported. Again, correlations are calculated on a group level,
and reliability is reported for subsamples.
Reliabilities vary considerably, more so than for bias and correspondence.
Table 4.3: Validity of Accuracy Components (Group Level, N=43)
Stereotype Differential Differential
accuracy elevation accuracy
Retest reliability .11 - .57 .05 - .45 -.17 - .53
Age .11/-.16 -.05/-.12 .04/-.07
Gender -.11/.12 -.14/.05 -.38∗/.11
Intelligence -.16/.02 -.24/-.14 .15/.15
Knowledge .02/.23 .14/.26 -.20/.04
EI Overall .33∗/.30+ .26/.29 .03/-.15
EI Perception .43∗∗/.27+ .24/.17 -.16/-.06
EI Facilitation .14/.14 .13/.21 .20/-.14
EI Understanding .24/.14 .21/.06 .10/-.09
EI Management .05/.25 .10/.35∗ .00/-.15
Neuroticism .12/-.08 .06/-.14 .02/-.15
Extraversion -.35∗/-.11 -.31∗/-.05 .17/.04
Conscientiousness -.15/.20 .01/.37∗ .06/-.08
Agreeableness -.09/-.10 -.21/-.09 .22/.11
Openness -.20/-.25 -.22/-.10 .30+/.30+
Task conflict -.31∗/-.32∗ -.20/-.14 .18/.06
Relationship conflict -.44∗∗/-.41∗∗ -.47∗∗/-.45∗∗ .31∗/.22
Friendship -.09/-.33∗ -.06/-.04 -.08/-.29+
Competence .30∗/.18 .44∗∗/.38∗ -.23/-.28+
Term paper .13/.26 .15/.09 .15/.24
Mean .32/.32 .27/.33 .12/.16
SD .18/.18 .14/.15 .10/.12
a Positive intercorrelations indicate higher values for males.
b Higher term paper ratings indicate better performance.
+ :p< .10
∗ :p< .05
∗∗ :p< .01, two-tailed
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Especially the stability of differential accuracy is alarming, and it does not
seem suitable as a measure of individual differences. Mean differential ac-
curacy and variance is considerably lower than for the other components.
Stereotype accuracy and differential elevation show better stability and are
positively related to conflict measures and peer ratings. It can be assumed
that a rough prediction, i.e. matching the mean profiles, is adaptive. Also,
stereotype accuracy and differential elevation are related to emotional intel-
ligence, i.e. emotional perception, especially for earlier ratings.
4.2.2 The Person as Unit of Analysis
4.2.2.1 Perceiver and Target Effects
Following the social relation model, a round robin design allows to differ-
entiate actor and partner effects in groups (Kenny, 1994). Typically, an
actor effect of e.g. affection indicates that certain participants like others
to a higher degree. Partner effects indicate that some are better liked than
others. In context of interpersonal perception, another dimension is added
and perceiver and target effects are distinguished. When people are asked
how much affection they will feel for each other, perceiver effects indicate
that some people are good in predicting affection. Target effects indicate
that affection can be better predicted as to certain targets. In other words,
perceiver effects capture that some participants are better judges, target
effects indicate that some participants are easier to read.
In the current study, another dimension is added. Participants not only
predict their feelings for others, but they are asked to predict the others will
feel towards the others, e.g. how group member A will feel toward member
B. This adds a partner effect of the second degree, specifically variance due
to member B. Data analysis followed the recommendations of Kenny and
West (2006) and was conducted with SPSS 17. The recommended mixed
model approach was slightly extended to add target effects of the second
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degree. Table 4.4 shows the results for predictions and bias. Correspondence
can not be analyzed since profile correlations already combine two sets of
measurements.
Both for emotional predictions alone and for bias, a lot of variance is
unaccounted for. Perceiver variance is the largest component in emotional
predictions. This means that participants vary in their tendency to predict
higher or lower affect. With more acquaintance (T2) the target of the sec-
ond degree explains more variance. This suggests that predictions vary in
terms of how much anger or fun someone elicits, rather than how much fun
is someone likely to feel. Bias on the other hand has a smaller perceiver ef-
fect. This is bad news for the search of a good judge of emotions. Accuracy
scores in terms of bias mainly vary with the target of the second degree.
In other words, the feelings toward some participants are easier to predict,
presumably because of special behavior like free riding or diligence. This
demonstrates the context-dependency of this measure, and it does not sup-
port accuracy as a valid measure of interindividual differences regarding an
ability. Perhaps people do focus on certain individuals and disregard others.
Which could be adaptive in terms of emotional intelligence, especially when
a rough scan indicates the absence of a threat. Still, an independent mea-
sure of emotional knowledge (that does not vary regarding different targets)
is necessary (see section 5.3).
4.2.2.2 Bias and Correspondence
First, the relationship between accuracy and intelligence, emotional intelli-
gence, and personality is examined on an individual level3. Dependency in
3The analyses are conducted with accuracy for T1. Since a causal effect of accuracy
on adaptive criteria is theoretically assumed, the temporal precedence of the cause is
necessary (Cook, Campbell, & Peracchio, 1990). This way, the latent skill underlying
early predictions can be influential in the interaction with fellow group members. Even if
construal level theory suggest that later predictions should be more elaborate because of
less temporal distance (Liberman et al., 2002), later predictions are also potentially too
close to the actual experiences for the self, or emotional perceptions of others.
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Table 4.4: Effects for Perceivers, Targets, and Targets of the Second Degree
Variance component SD Variance explanation
T1/T2 T1/T2 T1/T2
Emotional predictions
Perceiver .15 / .21 .02 / .03 11 / 12%
Target .03 / .04 .01 / .01 2 / 3%
Target 2 .04 / .12 .01 / .02 3 / 7%
Bias
Perceiver .31 / .48 .07 / .10 2 / 3%
Target .17 / .25 .15 / .14 1 / 2%
Target 2 .99 / .89 .26 / .22 6 / 6%
Note. When person A predicts the anger that person B will feel toward person C, A is
the perceiver, B is the target, and C is the target 2.
the data will be controlled with multilevel modeling in a random intercept
model (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).
In contrast to the anxiety study, individuals are modeled on level one,
and groups are modeled on level 2. Abilities, traits, and criteria will be
predicted with the accuracy components following Cronbach (1955). For
the example of intelligence (I) as the independent variable and elevation
(bias), stereotype accuracy (SA), differential elevation (DE), and differential
accuracy (DA) as predictors, the model is as follows:
Iij = β0j + β1jBiasij + β2jSAij + β3jDEij + β4jDAij + rij (4.1a)
β0j = γ00 + u0j (4.1b)
β1j = γ10 (4.1c)
β2j = γ20 (4.1d)
β3j = γ30 (4.1e)
β4j = γ40 (4.1f)
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All accuracy scores are unrelated to intelligence (p>.38), gender (p>.23),
age (p>.19), agreeableness (p>.48), conscientiousness (p<.17), emotional
facilitation (p<.27), emotional understanding (p<.44), and emotional man-
agement (p<.68). There is an association to knowledge though. Knowl-
edge is related to lower bias (especially for others, β = −.34, t=-1.728,
p=.086) and lower differential accuracy (β = −3.04, t=-2.699, p=.008). Ex-
traverts tend to have a higher bias (both for self and others, β = .16, t=
3.382, p=.001) and lower stereotype accuracy (β = −.40, t= 1.895, p=.059).
There is a trend for neuroticism to be associated to a lower bias (especially
for others, β = −.82, t= -1.884, P=.061). Openness relates to higher bias
(both for self an others, β = .16, t=3.657, p=.001), lower stereotype accu-
racy (β = −.36, t=-2.24, p=.027) and higher differential accuracy (β = .40,
t=2.011, p=.046). Differential Elevation is related to emotional perception
(β = .08, t=2.59, p=.011).
Next, adaptability of accuracy is analyzed with the individual as the
unit of analysis. First term paper ratings are explored. It is not possible
to model term paper ratings as a dependent variable in multilevel modeling
since it only varies on the group level. Instead, accuracy can be modeled
as the outcome variable, and the strength of association can be estimated
when the term paper rating (TPR) serves as a group level predictor. For
the example of bias, the following model is estimated:
Biasij = β0j + rij (4.2a)
β0j = γ00 + γ01TPR+ u0j (4.2b)
Sequential analyses are conducted for all accuracy measures. Better
term paper ratings are related to lower bias for the self (β = −.30, t=-3.083,
p=.004) and unrelated to other accuracy measures. This indicates adapt-
ability of a low bias. Whether this relationship is incremental to knowledge
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can not be decided with multilevel modeling. Instead, incremental validity
is tested on a group level using hierarchical linear regression. When eleva-
tion is added to a model with age, gender, intelligence and the big 5, bias
leads to a substantial model improvement, i.e. it shows incremental validity
(β = −.59,∆R2 = .27, p < .001). This model includes 9 predictors which
is a lot given that the there are 43 groups. Results are replicated for a
more parsimonious model, and bias also adds to age, gender, and intelli-
gence (β = −.35,∆R2 = .17, p = .04). When elevation for self and others
are differentiated, elevation for the self leads to the model improvement.
For all other criteria, multilevel models can be used. Table 4.5 shows
the results for peer ratings of task and relationship conflict, Table 4.6 those
for competence and friendship. In the Tables, the first step uses accuracy
to predict the criteria. Then, intelligence, knowledge, personality, and de-
mographic data is included. Typically, these steps are reversed to assess
incremental validity, but the current sequence allows to examine the rela-
tionship of accuracy to criteria alone. The PRE, as a measure comparable
to ∆R2 is reported for the typical sequence, i.e. it captures the incremental
validity of accuracy over intelligence and personality. The MSCEIT will not
be entered in the model since the validity of accuracy is not required to be
incremental to emotional intelligence.
Results show that none of the accuracy measures relate to task conflict.
Participants that are female, intelligent, open, and conscientious, though,
are more likely to evoke peer ratings of task conflict. Intelligence, knowl-
edge, personality, and demographic data accounts for 11% of the variance
compared to the null model. Accuracy adds less than .1%. For relationship
conflict, bias shows incremental validity over personality and intelligence.
Other abilities and traits lead to a PRE of 21%, and bias adds an additional
6%. When biases for self vs. others are distinguished, both are significant
(p<.05).
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Table 4.5: Hierarchical Random Intercept Model for Task and Relationship Conflict
Task conflict Relationship conflict
Coefficient (t-ratio) Coefficient (t-ratio)
Step one
Intercept 1.83∗∗∗ (8.06) 1.21∗∗∗ (6.70)
Elevation .09 (1.40) .16∗∗ (3.28)
Stereotype Accuracy -.28 (-1.45) .05 (-.24)
Differential Elevation .02 (.07) -.38 (.25)
Differential Accuracy -.11 (-.53) .23 (1.04)
Step two
Intercept -1.43 (-1.59) -.29 (-.44)
Age .02+ (1.67) .01 (1.50)
Gender -.24∗ (-2.29) -.07 (-.65)
Intelligence .02∗∗ (3.09) .02∗∗ (2.99)
Knowledge -.04+ (-1.73) -.06∗ (2.00)
Neuroticism .09 (1.04) -.01 (-.06)
Extraversion .08 (1.03) .03 (.52)
Conscientiousness .13∗∗ (2.87) -.01 (-.25)
Agreeableness -.08 (-1.09) -.07 (-1.80)
Openness .22∗∗ (3.65) -.16∗∗ (3.30)
Elevation .06 (.75) .13∗ (2.54)
Stereotype Accuracy -.32 (-1.37) -.09 (-.40)
Differential Elevation .13 (.34) -.37 (-1.18)
Differential Accuracy -.33 (-1.27) .12 (.64)
Note. Gender: positive values indicate that male persons show higher values.
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Table 4.6: Hierarchical Random Intercept Model for Competence and Friendship
Competence Friendship
Fixed effects Coefficient(t-ratio) Coefficient (t-ratio)
Step one
Intercept 4.47∗∗∗ (15.85) 2.20∗∗∗ (10.53)
Elevation -.19∗∗ (-3.05) .06 (-.95)
Stereotype Accuracy -.85∗∗ (-3.03) -.20 (-1.04)
Differential Elevation .41 (.94) .03 (.25)
Differential Accuracy -.44 (-1.31) -.02 (-.07)
Step two
Intercept 2.49 (1.36) .09 (.07)
Age -.02 (-1.02) -.01 (-.22)
Gender -.03 (-.16) -.02 (-.12)
Intelligence .01 (.59) <.01 (.71)
Knowledge .08∗ (2.43) .02 (.53)
Neuroticism .06 (.51) .11 (1.25)
Extraversion .10 (.84) .10 (1.17)
Conscientiousness <.01 (<.01) -.04 (-.38)
Agreeableness -.11 (-.84) .17 (1.79+)
Openness .04 (.30) -.05 (-.58)
Elevation -.19∗ (-2.42) -.04 (-.60)
Stereotype Accuracy -.71∗ (-2.19) -.24 (-1.07)
Differential Elevation .45 (.92) .30 (.90)
Differential Accuracy -.27 (-.68) -.09 (-.24)
Note. Gender: positive values indicate that male persons show higher values.
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Knowledge is associated with higher peer ratings of competence and,
again, lower bias improves this model. Surprisingly, higher stereotype ac-
curacy is related to lower ratings of competence. This accuracy does not
seem to be adaptive. On a group level, though, higher stereotype accuracy
was associated with higher average competence ratings (see Table 4.3). In
sum, the measurement quality of the decomposed accuracy scores has to
be questioned. Intelligence, personality, and demographics show a PRE of
25%. Accuracy scores add another 11%.
Agreeable participants are slightly more likely to be perceived as a friend.
Apart from that, intelligence, personality, and demographic data do not
explain friendship ratings. The PRE is 7 %. Accuracy measures do not add
to the model.
4.3 Discussion
Again, results will be discussed with regard to the research questions. First,
results on the stability of accuracy are summarized (4.3.1), then the rela-
tionship of accuracy to other abilities and traits is revised (4.3.2), and finally
the adaptability of accuracy is addressed (4.3.3).
4.3.1 Stability of Bias and Correspondence
Retest reliabilities were good for simple difference scores and bias, but
problematic for correspondence. Especially correspondence for others and
correspondence after variance decomposition show reliabilities that do not
meet common standards. At least results for differential accuracy should
be treated with caution. This is the most interesting accuracy type as to
Cronbach (1955), but Kenny and Albright (1987) already mentioned that
the decomposition can lead to a lack of stability for this component. Hence,
they recommended group level analysis. Indeed, on a group level, plausi-
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ble associations to stereotype accuracy and differential elevation are found.
With the individual as the unit of analysis, correspondence is less successful
in predicting the criteria than bias. Future research should try to reduce
unsystematic error variance in order to further improve the measurement
quality, especially of correspondence (see section 5.3).
Only for self-predictions, bias and correspondence improve over time.
This may be due to the fact that the experienced emotions during late
predictions were closer to the target emotions at the end of the term. For
others, there seems to be a lack of accurate feedback as to their feelings.
Generally, predicting the feelings of others is a more difficult task.
In addition, social relations analysis shows that a substantial proportion
of variance is due to targets, so that accuracy of predictions is not stable
over different targets. Again, context has to be taken into account when
examining emotional perception accuracy.
4.3.2 Bias, Correspondence, and other Abilities and Traits
On a group level, accuracy for later self predictions is associated with knowl-
edge. On an individual level, this relationship for correspondence can not
be found, but lower bias was again associated with knowledge, especially
for others. This is plausible since important errors of emotional predictions,
motivated distortions (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003), can not occur when pre-
dictions are made for others. This supports the assumption that accuracy
captures an aspect of knowledge. There are no relations to intelligence.
On a group level, correspondence for others is associated with emotional
understanding which provides evidence that something similar is measured
here. Again, relations to correspondence can only be found on a group level.
Given the conceptual closeness of the emotional prediction accuracy to emo-
tional understanding, few relations between these concepts are unexpected.
It would be cause for more concern, though, if there was a ’gold standard’
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for the measurement of EI which currently, there is not (Matthews et al.,
2012, p. 120).
Regarding other branches of EI, accuracy for self predictions is associated
with emotional management on a group level, and there are some relations
to emotional facilitation. Also, emotional perception is related to higher
stereotype accuracy on a group level and higher differential elevation on an
individual level. Accordingly, some closeness of the accuracy measures to
the MSCEIT can be demonstrated.
There are substantial relationships to personality. On a group level,
openness is related to a higher bias and extraversion is associated to lower
accuracy for others. On an individual level, extraversion and openness again
relate to a higher bias with openness also being related to lower stereotype
and higher differential accuracy. Neuroticism, on the other hand, goes along
with less bias. These relationships seem to reflect personal styles and moti-
vations captured with personality measures.
4.3.3 The Adaptability of Bias and Correspondence
The results regarding adaptability are encouraging. Lower bias is substan-
tially associated with better term paper ratings and better peer ratings, even
incrementally to intelligence and personality. Specifically, participants with
lower bias were rated as more competent by their peers and there was less
relationship conflict reported with them. This supports the assumption that
accurate knowledge can provide control over a situation and help to achieve
personal and interactional goals. Furthermore, accuracy relates to strong
criteria that are independent from self-report. There are no relations to less
task conflict, but indeed task conflict can be beneficial and promote group
success (De Dreu & Weingart, 2003). Also, no relations to peer ratings of
friendship are found. The intention to become friends with specific others
should be a moderating influence here.
Chapter 5
General Discussion
5.1 Theoretical Considerations
The focus of this thesis was to evaluate the validity and adaptability of
accuracy of emotional predictions. In the anxiety study, this was done in a
setting similar to affective forecasting research, and with a clear focus on test
anxiety in a specific situation. The work-group study broadened the scope
to a complex social context. It focused on the prediction of interpersonal
feelings in newly emerging work-groups with a common goal.
It is important to note that EI, as measured in the branches of the
MSCEIT, and accuracy, as measured here, are functions not processes (cf.
Matthews, Zeidner, & Roberts, 2007). Inferences about the feelings of others
require the use of contextual information and a combination of information
derived from situation- and person-specific cues (cf. Gnepp, 1989; Robinson
& Clore, 2002a). Thus, the context has to be taken into account.
It can be questioned that emotional intelligence and emotional knowl-
edge generalize over different domains (Matthews et al., 2007). Emotional
knowledge should guide the selection of coping strategies, or more gener-
ally emotion management tactics (cf. Matthews & Zeidner, 2000), but this
does not guarantee universally positive outcomes. The employed strategy
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might only make a slight difference in certain situations but might still be
advantageous to try. Strategies may only apply to certain situations or be
maladaptive as to certain criteria (Matthews et al., 2012). Future research
should aim to further clarify the nature of emotional knowledge and of the
situational specifics that promote its adaptability.
Given the relationship to intelligence, emotional intelligence, and per-
sonality, it is obvious that accuracy of emotional predictions can not serve
as a proxy measure of emotional understanding. Still, there are plausible re-
lations to the MSCEIT and knowledge, so that there is hope for the concept.
In any case, though, measurement quality has to be improved.
Results on the adaptability of bias are encouraging, results on corre-
spondence are mixed. There is evidence that low bias leads to less distress,
less negative coping, better term paper ratings, and better peer ratings. In
addition, there is indication for incremental validity.
In the anxiety study, there was more control over the situational circum-
stances. Also, social cognition research provided a theoretical framework for
specific aspects of emotional knowledge, i.e. knowledge about mood repair
processes and the temporal progression of emotions (Gilbert et al., 1998).
The duration bias was found on a group level, but an examination of indi-
vidual differences suggests that a lower bias is preferable, especially when
trait anxiety is low.
The environment in the work-group study was highly complex, and there
was a lot of variance unaccounted for. Also, participants reported little re-
lationship conflict. Nevertheless, bias was adaptive as to hard criteria. For
correspondence, retest reliability is in part problematic, especially after vari-
ance decomposition and especially for differential accuracy. Correspondence
is useful to predict criteria on a group level but the measurement quality
needs to be improved for analyses on an individual level. However, future
research has to explore whether there is use for differential accuracy of emo-
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tional predictions, even if it was reliably measured. Being able to predict
someone’s emotions really well might not be adaptive. It can suffice to have
a rough estimate in terms of stereotype accuracy and differential elevation
(as general rules about traits and targets) and to be open to changes in the
situations. The reasoning about predictions should probably not be overly
extensive but flexible.
5.2 Strengths and Limitations
The studies in this thesis focus on emotionally relevant situations with high
personal and practical importance. Strong and emotionally relevant criteria
were used and incremental validity could be assessed since all participants
conducted extensive diagnostic batteries. The work-group-study addition-
ally focused on the social dimension of emotional knowledge and allowed for
the distinction of several specific targets. Thus, it offers the opportunity
to examine the prediction of emotions in relationships and to decompose
accuracy as to certain targets and dimensions. The accuracy measures were
more ambitious than in studies that focus on the interindividual differences
in affective forecasting accuracy, and that rely on simple difference scores
(Dunn et al., 2007; Hoerger, 2012; Hoerger et al., 2012).
The main shortcoming, though, is the lack of control, especially in the
work-group study. Participants were to mentally simulate an upcoming
event and apply general and target-specific rules to predict emotional re-
actions. Chances were high that the situation in question (the end of the
semester) was misconstrued (cf. Wilson & Gilbert, 2003) since participants
had to deal with a lot of uncertainty. Inaccuracy is not only due to a lack of
emotional knowledge but presumably due to changes in the situation that
could not have been anticipated. For example, someone could have suffered
a personal loss and missed out on a lot of work, or someone is won over
for the empirical method and engages more than expected. Nonetheless,
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it could be argued that the current scenario of uncertainty is realistic and
of great practical relevance. Still, given the unsystematic error variance,
knowledge should be measured more directly as proposed in section 5.3.
Given that the emotional predictions are designed to measure ability EI,
correlations to EI and intelligence are in part disappointing. One can argue
that low correlations are also due to the fact that the accuracy of emo-
tional predictions is basically measured with one item, i.e. one emotionally
challenging situation.
Differentiated knowledge about the development of emotions over time,
and about the way that certain emotions are rank ordered is better reflected
in correspondence measures. These measures are more sensitive to situa-
tional and personal details but they are also far less robust than bias, as an
aggregated composite measure. This is reflected in low retest reliability or
at least a broad range of reliabilities. In spite of low measurement quality,
some relationships are found, and there is evidence for the theoretical value
of correspondence scores. The accuracy decomposition and the focus on
various targets are powerful tools to further explore emotional knowledge in
a social context.
5.3 Implications for Future Research
Current literature on EI emphasizes the need to focus on specific abilities
and to understand these abilities in specific contexts with a broad theoretical
basis (Matthews et al., 2012; Mayer et al., 2008). The current findings
support this notion. The relationship between emotional knowledge and
criteria is complex and moderating influences need to be examined.
It is recommendable to continue researching emotional knowledge in re-
gard to social relations. Motivated distortions or useful biases that might
complicate self-predictions (e.g. Wilson & Gilbert, 2003) do not apply to
the predictions for others. This warrants the general assumption that ac-
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curate knowledge about others is adaptive. The sesults of the work-group
study subtly hint to this possibility. On a group level, emotional under-
standing is mildly associated with correspondence for others, and it predicts
improved peer ratings. Here, accuracy decomposition seems useful but the
measurement quality has to be improved.
This can be done in two different ways. The first approach operates
within the current framework of predicted and experienced emotional reac-
tions. The goal is to gain control over the situation and to reduce unsys-
tematic variance. To avoid misconstrual and to better capture the affective
theories (cf. Wilson & Gilbert, 2003), confederates can help to set a specific
context for emotional predictions. This context can be highly comparable
among participants, and instructions could additionally set comparable in-
teractional goals. For example, participants get the know the confederate
and are instructed to handle their complaints. Predict associated emotions
can then be related to experienced ones. This would also reduce target vari-
ance, i.e. that some people are easier to read than others. Target variance
was substantial in the current study.
The second approach allows to continue to examine emotional knowledge
in a complex setting but it involves taking a different measurement approach
to emotional knowledge. People have to deal with complexity and uncer-
tainty in real life and apply situation- and person-specific beliefs as they see
fit (Robinson & Clore, 2002a). To better understand the reasoning involved
and how individuals anticipate different outcomes, methods of the Berlin
wisdom paradigm can be applied (Baltes & Smith, 2008). Think-aloud pro-
tocols can be used to capture ’rich factual and procedural knowledge’ (p.58),
knowledge about certain contexts, and knowledge about uncertainties. This
can be useful to further examine the basis of predictions. Applied rules
can be differentiated and rated as to quantity and quality. Also, personal
motivations and goals should be elaborated on.
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The empathic accuracy paradigm also relies on open answers and adds a
qualitative dimension to the measurement of an emotional skill (Ickes, 1993,
2003). In this paradigm, participants watch videos of different scenarios
and infer thoughts and feelings of others. In its current form, the paradigm
measures emotional perception but it could be incorporated for emotional
knowledge, too. An emotion could be elicited in a lab, f.e. anxiety in
context of a public speaking task. Some participants could observe others
and elaborate on their emotional predictions for them. Other participant
partake in the public speaking task and elaborate on their own feelings.
A partly qualitative approach to the measurement of emotional knowl-
edge can add theoretical clarity, help to understand emotional expertise, and
guide the construction of future measurement tools. One can identify how
elaborate emotional rules are and how flexibly they are applied.
Another open question is the causal relationship between accuracy and
criteria. Manipulating accuracy in a experimental design is hardly possi-
ble. One could provide accurate and inaccurate emotional expectations in
a within-subjects design, but the conceptional closeness to actual knowl-
edge is unclear. Perhaps, after further clarifying the concept of emotional
knowledge, studies can compare trained and untrained individuals as to goal
attainment in emotionally challenging situations.
Joseph and Newman (2010) suggested emotional labor as a central mod-
erator of the EI-performance relationship. Emotional labor refers to the
extent that the regulation and display of emotions is part of the job. This
is believed to be particularly stressful when it involves surface acting, i.e.
the display of emotions without actually feeling them (Hochschild, 1983;
Grandey, 2000). Emotional labor should not have been a general problem in
the student work groups, but one could have measured the perceived need to
suppress feelings, f.e. with the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire by Gross
and John (2003). Following emotion regulation theories, antecedent focused
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emotion regulation can be distinguished from response-focused techniques.
The basic assumption is that regulating the true feeling is less exhausting
than faking a particular feeling (Gross & John, 2003).
Finally, romantic or family relationships are interesting to investigate.
As important relationships, they should be associated with rich emotional
knowledge: knowing how your partner handles performance situations, how
they react to criticism, or what promotes their relaxation after a day of
work.
5.4 Conclusion
There was strong support for the assumption that accuracy of emotional
predictions is adaptive. Especially a low bias shows substantial correlations
to strong criteria and proves to be incrementally valid. It is not about a
generally rosy view (i.e. simple difference scores) but about accuracy. How-
ever, under certain conditions (f.e. high trait anxiety), low accuracy seems
to be advantageous. This is evidence that emotional intelligence studies can
profit from studies in other emotion-related areas, f.e. social cognition or
coping research.
The support for accuracy as a cognitive ability close to EI is moderate
or low. It is argued that emotional knowledge should also be measured
independently from actual experiences. With open-ended questions and
partly qualitative measures, knowledge underlying emotional predictions can
be better captured. The scoring of right and wrong can be more flexible than
it was in the current studies, and it can take situational changes into account.
Future research should continue to explore the social dimension of emotional
knowledge and accuracy decomposition can be used to distinguish emotion-
and person-specific beliefs.
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